The Principle of Procreative Altruism: A Critique

Authors

  • Íñigo de Miguel Beriain Investigador posdoctoral de la UPV/EHU en la Cátedra Interuniversitaria de Derecho y Genoma Humano
  • Ekain Payán Ellakuria Cátedra Interuniversitaria de Derecho y Genoma Humano

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14422/rib.i03.y2017.008

Keywords:

embryo selection, eugenics, beginning of life, PGD

Abstract

The Principle of Procreative Altruism has been recently proposed in the bioethics literature by two eminent authors, Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder. According to their definition, the Principle states that “If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, they have significant moral reason to select a child whose existence can be expected to contribute more to (or detract less from) the well-being of others than any alternative child they could have.” This paper is aimed to analyze the consistency of this principle and to introduce some considerations devoted to exclude any kind of unmoral consequence of its use.

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Published

2017-01-31

How to Cite

Miguel Beriain, Íñigo de, & Payán Ellakuria, E. (2017). The Principle of Procreative Altruism: A Critique. Revista Iberoamericana De Bioética, (3), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.14422/rib.i03.y2017.008

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Artículos