

## TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETICS IN EDMUND HUSSLER'S PHILOSOPHY: ORIGINALITY AND PRIMORDIALITY IN LIFE-WORLD

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**ABSTRACT:** The purpose of this article is to explain the relationship between Life-world (*Lebenswelt*) and the concepts of Originality (*Originalität*) and Primordiality (*Primordialität*) founded in Edmund Husserl's philosophy developed in the 20's. In order to achieve this goal, we need to begin with a transcendental phenomenological analysis to then gain access to Ontology of the World in general. Therefore, we must explain how Transcendental Philosophy relates to Transcendental Aesthetics and how it phenomenologically labels all that is outside of theory and reflection (i.e., the Natural World) as a precondition to all theoretical classifications. This way the Life-world could explain the relationship between the Originality and Primordiality as proto-datum that is the base of all human acts genetically describable.

**KEY WORDS:** Originality; Primordiality; Life-world; Transcendental Aesthetics; Transcendental Phenomenology.

### *Fenomenología trascendental y estética trascendental en la filosofía de Edmund Husserl: Originalidad y primordialidad en el mundo de la vida*

**RESUMEN:** El propósito de este artículo es explicar la relación entre el mundo de la vida (*Lebenswelt*) y los conceptos de originalidad (*Originalität*) y primordialidad (*Primordialität*) fundados en la filosofía de Edmund Husserl desarrollada en los 20's. Para conseguir este objetivo necesitamos comenzar con el análisis fenomenológico trascendental para luego ganar el acceso a la ontología del mundo en general. Por lo tanto, debemos explicar cómo la filosofía trascendental se relaciona con la estética trascendental y cómo esto caracteriza fenomenológicamente lo que está fuera de la teoría y de la reflexión (i. e. el mundo natural) como una precondition de toda clasificación teórica. De esta forma el mundo de la vida podría explicar la relación entre la originalidad y la primordialidad como proto-dato que está a la base de todos los actos humanos genéticamente descriptibles.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** originalidad; primordialidad; mundo de la vida; estética trascendental; fenomenología trascendental.

### INTRODUCTION

The subject of this work is the approach to Life-world (*Lebenswelt*) based on a science capable of genetically description to elucidating the sense of being of the world. This work will develop one of Husserl's statements written in 1924 in

the research manuscript: A III 4 «Ontologie (Eidetik und Ihre Methodologie)»<sup>1</sup>. It will begin by elucidating the general structure of the surrounding worlds and reveal the sense of a *a priori* of *Life-world*. This way, *Life-world* will be understood as *datum*, previous to any practical project, and once related to Worldview (*Weltanschauung*), it will show that pre-theoric and pre-thematic practices are still susceptible to phenomenological reduction. Thus, it will be possible to point out that if the *praxis* is constituted beyond mere subjective volition, then the *ego* cannot allow itself to continue in its initial naivety, instead it must think on the «secret history» of its own constitution. If in the *Life-world* we find ourselves in a field where we are in a peculiar attitude every moment—thanks to which we speak to others, living in community, love, and hate—then those everyday situations merit gaining phenomenological relevance. Thanks to the problematization of attitude as a phenomenological topic, it is possible to account for everyday life events without the need of a science unacquainted to life and incapable of displaying the living participation in the cultural world.

In such a way that, a science like this demands necessarily an ontology of *Life-world*, and it would be the *a priori* science that has the task of describing and capturing the general structures proper to subjective relativity and intersubjective *praxis*. It should be developed independently of subjective-transcendental interests and before the reflexive-transcendental attitude, on the very grounds of *Life-world*. Consequently, it will be presented in concomitance with an ontology willing to show how naivety is constituted in its surrounding world, and able to capture, in eidetic ultimacy, the sense of being of *Life-world* in general: thereupon where subjective-relative life is put into practice before scientific idealizations, objective attitudes and thematic intentionality.

An ontology of *Life-world* would reveal how the world has been given prior to any thematization. In addition, an ontology described from the general forms of its own givenness would not allow to begin with any realist ontology as the original material of intentionality. The natural world is the world immediately given as fundamental stratum, the original world giving itself without any thematic intervention.

This most primary situation has led us to move on from transcendental phenomenology—as the analysis where being is given validity independently of subjectivity (Kern 1964)—into transcendental aesthetics—as a descriptive ontology of the pre-theoretical *Life-world* in the realm of nature, starting from eidetic

<sup>1</sup> Edmund HUSSERL, *Ms A III 4: Title (Label): «Wesen und Möglichkeit strenger Wissenschaft. Rationale Wissenschaft und Ontologie. Notwendige Methode der Ontologie. Der Wesenswissenschaft von dem mundus formaliter spectatus geht notwendig vor an eine Wesenswissenschaft von der universalen Evidenz, der universalen Erfahrung von einer Welt überhaupt und der ihrer Möglichkeit, ihrer Vervollkommnung in infinitum. Die subjektiv gerichtete Erkenntnis geht voran. Letztlich führt das auf die transzendente Phänomenologie»*. (14 Blätter 1924: transzendente Logik und Analytik. S. 9 ff. Idealisation. 20 Blätter; Naturwissenschaftliche Erkenntnis, Erscheinungslehre, Zielidee der Endgültigkeit für naturwissenschaftliche Erkenntnis. Die älteren, noch wichtigen Mss. mit einigen neuen Ausführungen, No. of pages: 95, (1918-1926).

variations belonging to the realm of the fantasy and imagination—. This expansion has made it possible to think of the world as the *eidōs* of experience and, at the same time, assume that whatever was prior to the revelation of the being of the world is in no way a more original being, as suggested by the *VI. Cartesianische Meditation* (Fink 1998), but instead, it is the formal structure which makes possible to conceive the conditions for any appearance (*Erscheinung*). And, this is why the terms «originality» (*Originalität*) and «primordiality» (*Primordialität*) come to be required.

Under the title of originality, we set out from given in person (*leibhaftig*), thanks to which we can distinguish between that which was originally given to mundane experience and that which was given to transcendental experience. Whereas under the concept of primordiality we have established the original nature of this originality, going from the ordinary to the foundation of originality (Husserl 1973, 378-391). It was thus possible to legitimately found subsequent perceptions. If the transcendental phenomenology's originary impression (*Urimpression*) can establish any other perception, let us deduce that, thanks to transcendental aesthetic—from the unfolding of the world into an image—other perceptual moments will derive from this originary impression. Thus, we reach the eidetic structure of the pre-theoretical world, while realizing that the historical constitution of Life-world, based on worldviews, not only requires abstracting the solipsistic nature of the *ego cogito*, but also it shows that it is originally constituted by those views. *Weltanschauung*—opposed to the philosophical beginning based on the empirical, insofar as searching for a start that builds up from zero—reveals itself as the original way of givenness of Life-world, and it genetically explains how, historically and quotidianly, the being is rendered valid. This would show that phenomenology constitutes the genetics of appearance in general, in accord with the multiple ways of life of the *ego*.

However, the husserlian statement, upon which this reflection is based, points out to the following:

What must be studied here [for an ontology of the world]? «Weltanschauung», the world of experience, the aesthetic form of the world (the concept of Natural World), as a form of the experienced world. If I study in advance the expressions, its forms, the forms of its signification, its nucleus etc., then I develop concepts from them all. If I now develop the concept of nature of the world, I get the way in which there are evident laws (and that which is aprioristic about the predicative realm) as well as the realm of the forms of expressible «sentences» (substrates, sentences, etc.); therefore, I get the evident laws of the necessary structures of a world in general.

However, if I remained in this naivety, could I begin anything, from a glance, from essential generalities and laws, needless of the Platonic idea and its configuration for an evidently rational thinking?<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> As HUSSERL said: Ms A III 4, p. 24 b: «Was ist da zu studieren? Die «Weltanschauung», die Welt der Erfahrung, die ästhetische Welt form (der “natürliche Weltbegriff”) als Form der erfahrenen Welt. Ich studierte vorher die Aussagen, ihre Formen, die Formen ihrer Bedeutungen, Kerne etc. Ich bildete also Begriffe über all das. Jetzt bilde ich Begriffe des

In the following analysis we shall perform a systematic examination of these words.

## 1. THE APPROACH AND IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

The text that we present here pretends to set the conditions to clarify the genetic constitution of the being of the human beings who are living naturally. To do so, in accordance with transcendental aesthetics, it will address how transcendental phenomenology deals with the pre-ontological constitution of the world. It is well known that it wasn't until the early 1930s that Husserl re-approached the validity of «*Weltanschauung*» to elevate it to a dignifying level as an originary project of transcendental phenomenology (Bernet 1994, 98). And with that, he begins by counteracting the «big mistake» of «*Weltvernichtung*» (the world annihilation) so prevalent in the analysis of *Ideen I* (Husserl 1973, 621), where the correlation was divided between the presentation of the world (*Weltvorstellung*) and the living world (*lebendige Welt*). World annihilation would appear, at first, as a Cartesian proceeding that conserved the idea that the evident being is immanent and the dubitable being is transcendent. This dualism would substantiate the nature of the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*, and it would hinder, in turn, the understanding of the transcendental constitution. Known as the Cartesian Way (Kern 1964), the problem of solipsism will be presented as one difficulty to overcome (Husserl 1986) where Husserl considers it a «bigmistake» to have suggested the idealism presented in *Ideen I* in association with a solipsistic conception of transcendental subjectivity (Kern 1979). In attention to the world as a correlate would entail the denial of the transcendental *a priori* of intentionality; a dysfunction of its pre-egological nature. Thus, it would consolidate a solipsism beginning by the suspension of the *a priori* validity of intentionality by irremediably putting appearance at the disposition of the *ego*. Herein lays the importance of his reformulation.

This re-approach states, on the one hand, that with the introduction of «*Weltanschauung*», Husserl could treat the givenness of the world, according to its own historicity, by offering it genetically beyond just being objectified and delivered to intuition, on the other hand, it states that this «world view» could be destroyed and annihilated without violating the phenomenological principle of the *a priori* of intentionality. This change made it possible to show the practical condition of the interestedly directed *ego* (to a task, its

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Natur der Welt, ich gewinne wie dort evidente Gesetze (und Apriorische über das prädikative Reich) und das Reich der Formen von darin aussagbaren "Sätzen" (Substrat-Sätzen etc.), so hier evidente Gesetze der notwendigen Struktur einer Welt überhaupt.

Ich verbliebe in dieser Naivität. Aber könnte ich irgend etwas anfangen, ohne von des platonischen Idee und ihrer Ausgestaltung zu einem evidenten rationalen Denken, von einer Erfassung von Idee und ihrer Ausgestaltung zu einem evidenten rationalen Denken, von einer Erfassung von Wesensallgemeinheiten und Wesensgesetzen Gebrauch zu machen?»

values, judgments, etc.). With all this, such a reformulation allows access to a mereology that would include different strata of familiar worlds which could be expanded and captured from various practical interests, different urgent problems, vital concerns, etc. (Husserl 2008, 523-525); as well as that which could lead us to the possibility of abolishing the world without objectifying it (since the world does not belong to the field of material givenness nor is it exhausted by experience).

These analyses were carried out thanks to the horizon-intentionality (*Horizontintentionalität*) (Husserl 1959 and 1974). With it, Husserl can think of different ways of givenness that expand beyond the present. One way is the horizon of retentions and protentions as it apperceptively surrounds the present grasp of an object. Another way is the side of active and passive motivation, it is that which drives the self to fulfill a series of different acts, to carry out one possibility of experience before another, to expand or reduce the field of vision, etc. This means, that those ways which are inherent to the intentionality of the horizon would help consider the continuity of the subject's life, motivations and, in general, the relationship between the practical and eidetic modalities upon which transcendental habits of the self of phenomenological attitude are considered.

Both contemplations will be fundamental to the understanding of this discourse.

## 2. HUSSERL AND FINK: ONTOLOGY OR TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Before going any further into our directing guideline, it is necessary to clarify certain supporting elements. The first one concerns to the problem of the being of the world and its constitution, as well as its method of analysis. It must answer the question: How is the being of the world constituted in concomitance with what is phenomenologically its own? Based on this we can know whether transcendental phenomenology is previous or not to the ontology that influences Eugen Fink and upon which he bases most of his critique of Husserl.

Eugen Fink's drafts in *VI. Cartesianische Meditation* (Fink 1998) are contemporary to the discovery of horizon intentionality. In them, he holds that the idea of givenness, preserved in the idea of pre-givenness of the world, would assume the condition of mundane perception as given in the present, that is, as a type of experience of the correlative field. This explains why, for Fink, the idea of a horizon of all horizons, derived from the «*Horizontintentionalität*», would be based on the presentification of consciousness and open horizons from the originary impression (*Urimpression*). Fink asserts that Husserl, even without predetermining a particular ontology, is obligated to open certain gaps for the fulfillment of concordant experiences in support of a specific ontology (either material or formal). That is what allows him to assume that the idea of the world as pre-givenness would be based on a present givenness that

would refer the world back to a givenness that would only be valid during the time of consciousness, and which would be based on an originally subjective perception. The originary impression, essentially present, would draw, through the horizons of retention and protention, that which is given around the present object. Therefore, the horizontal analysis would be recognized only from experiences and fields that are open to consciousness. With that, consciousness would ultimately be the author of the existence of the world.

It is true that Fink substitutes pre-givenness for a transcendental pre-structure of being in order to find in it a phenomenological residue that can survive at phenomenological reduction. However, this strategy favors ontology before intuition, reason, logic, concepts, and language, since they are considered born mundanely<sup>3</sup>. If these mundane «notes» should be preserved *transcendentally*, in order to then preserve subjectivity once reduction has been applied, then Fink links *human reason* with *transcendental reason* (at the cost of concealing certain independence between transcendental reason and its human origin). This indicates that, if the constitutive occurrence of transcendental life precedes all being, since transcendental life would be the only one that could constitute the being and it must be purified of all human apperception, then transcendental life can only be experienced by that which constitutes it. With this, Fink must confront the problem of Western metaphysics and explain: How do the *ens* and that which is transcendental relate to each other without falling into aporia? To try to answer this question he begins by assuming, on the one hand, a being that must be named «*ens*» and, on the other, the need to transcend natural life by making it a moment to eliminate once transcendental reflection is reached. It is here, facing this antinomy, that Fink could go no further. As it asks, finally, for the essence of the being of the *ego* whilst being eminently divided between the natural and the transcendental.

Husserl offers a route beyond this impasse. If to him the *Vor-sein* can be directly processed by themes through reflection and become a «being» in experience<sup>4</sup> (*erlebnismäßigen «Seins»*), it is because *Vor-sein* must be understood

<sup>3</sup> As HUSSERL (1988, p. 77) said: «Darin liegt nun ein zentrales Problem beschlossen. Haben wir wirklich in äusserster Radikalität die phänomenologische Epoché zur Durchführung gebracht, so muss damit implizite der Einklammerung verfallen sein auch die in mundanen Entwicklungsprozessen erworbene Disposition zu theoretisieren, d. h. die *weltliche erwachsene Vernunft, Logik, Begrifflichkeit und Sprache*» [Now here is a key problem. If we have effectively completed the phenomenological epoché with extreme radicality, then the disposition to theorize acquires in the mundane processes of development such as *reason, mundanely born logic, conceptualization and language*; wich should als fall *implicity* in the parenthesis].

<sup>4</sup> As HUSSERL (2002) said «Daher ist der Urstrom als solcher, das Strömen in seiner Weise des erlebnismäßigen “Seins” immer außerthematish, außer für den Phänomenologen, der eben damit aus diesem Vorsein Sein schafft und somit allein die transzendente Subjektivität, die er selbst ist (und die der Anderen), nach ihrem erfahrbaren Sein als seiend hat: Er bildet transzendente Apperzeptionen, durch die das transzendente Ich mit allem, was es in sich ist, Stromform etc., transzendental apperzipiert und somit vorgegeben ist; er konstituiert die “transzendente Welt”» [So the original flow as such, flowing in its way of «being» in

as a category belonging to the theory of knowledge, not to ontology<sup>5</sup>. That is to say, that which is before the being of the world is not a more original being but the structure that makes possible its intellection, meaning that upon which rest the conditions for the event of being. This reflection is not exclusive to the late twenties. The idea of a precondition capable of surviving all Givenness (and to be itself irreducible) had already been genetically announced in §§ 6 and 7 of the Fifth Investigation of the 1901 *Logische Untersuchungen*. There it was called «original flow». With that concept, Husserl indicated that ontological commitments are offered to experiences within the flow itself, always in extra-thematic ways and as a constant excess of the phenomenologist field of attention —since he would be part of such flow—. Thus, returning to the problems addressed in the early 1930s, when, by affirming that «the phenomenologist constitutes the “transcendental world”» Husserl (2002, 183), is criticizing the introduction of ontology as the most original feature of general phenomenological reflection.

This is the way Husserl overcomes the antinomy in which Fink was stalled. He understands that it which is transcendental is prior to any event of being, even a natural one, and that it must be understood as the final field that prepares any kind of ontological givenness, since subjectivity is mentioned along with being. This indicates that, intentionality, as the structure of givenness of the world, precedes such events. It is thus emphasized that transcendental phenomenology is conceived as the path to elucidating the forms of givenness of being to subjectivity, and according to the modal possibilities pertaining to the peculiarity of its correlates (such as acts of waiting, liking, desire, rejection, etc.), as well as to the habitualness that belong to the mundane *ego*<sup>6</sup> (like habits that correspond to a familiar, special, psychic world, that is to say, to the natural attitude in general). When expounding transcendental philosophy, Fink limits the correlates of consciousness to the grammar of the *ens* —contrary to Husserl’s

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experience is always extra-thematic, external to the phenomenologist who, precisely because of this, forms the being from this pre-being and, therefore, has only as *ens* the transcendental subjectivity which is himself (and that other), according to his experiential being: he forms the transcendental apperceptions by which the transcendental self, with all that he is in himself, the ways of flow, etc., is apperceived transcendentially and, therefore, pre-given; he constitutes the «transcendental world»]. (p. 183)

<sup>5</sup> As HUSSERL (1973, pp. 613-617) said from a static phenomenology’s point of view: «[D]ie universal Struktur der Weltgeltung, die Enthüllung der Geltungsstruktur in Rückbeziehung auf die ontologische Struktur als die der geltenden Welt selbst. Geltungsstruktur = das System der Geltungsfundierungen» [The universal structure of the validity of the world, the discovery of the structure of validity in retrospective relation with the ontological structure as far as the valid world itself. Structure of validity = the system of foundations of validity].

<sup>6</sup> As FINK (1998, 79) said: «Und wenn Erkenntnis sich auf sich selbst bezieht, so ist es dann nur möglich, weil die Erkenntnis selbst “seiend” ist. Nicht nur der Gegenstand, und nicht nur das Erkennen selbst sind jeweils, “Seiendes”, sondern der Bezug ist ein seiender Bezug: ein “Seinsverhältnis zwischen Seienden”» [And when knowing relates to itself, the this relationship is only possible because knowing itself is an «ens». Not only the object, neither exclusively knowing itself are respectively «entia», but the relationship is an ontic relationship: a «relationship of being between two entia»].

exposition in, e.g., Hua XVII (1974, § 8)—, forcing the thought of only one form of the being giving itself to its own effective occurrence, since it accepts that every correlate is an *ens* at the moment when consciousness «operates» an intention, even if it's consciousness itself what was intended. This way, Fink would perform a double submission: on the one hand, he would take transcendental analysis to the grammar of being and, on the other, he would force the acceptance of transcendental reflection being exhausted in ontic descriptions.

However, the discussion about the first science of being points out two objectives. The first one reveals the aporetic nature of a philosophy that would try to be both transcendental and ontological-realistic. The second one explains that without the original elucidation of pre-existing forms of being, no ontology could distinguish among the several regions of the being of the *ens* and, therefore, the analysis of the world and its facticity would not be completed under a univocal ontology since it would not know how to distinguish among the several regions that are effectively differentiated by their practices. The latter, therefore, would indicate that the eidetic understanding of the natural attitude is not subjected only to praxis.

### 3. ORIGINALITY AND PRIMORDIALITY

The foregoing should have established the antecedence of transcendental phenomenology to ontology. So, once this principle is set into place, we can ask: Is it possible to relate *Weltanschauung* to *Horizontintentionalität*? In order to answer such question, it is necessary to think of the originary foundation of *Weltanschauung* at the heart of *transcendental aesthetics*. By taking this «step» we will be able to support that it is possible to identify Life-world with the primordial world without finding ourselves bound to any merely conceptual or theoretical intellection. To do this, it is necessary to show how the concepts of primordiality and originality relate to Life-world. We will take this up as follows.

Conveniently, in «Zum Begriff der Originalität», text from 1925 included in *Husserliana XIV*, a title stands out, which goes from the concept of original experience to the fundamentals of transcendental aesthetics. It is here where the title of *Originalität* is related to the title of *Primordialität*. *Originalität* is inseparable from the perceptive experience of the givenness of a *leibhaftig* object and its indebted exposure to an analytic distinction of what's original in mundane experience and transcendental experience. This indicates, on the one hand, that if originality is in its own as exclusively «mine» at the heart of that which is original, it must comprehend constitutive degrees where «primordial originality» would express the sphere of what is given to me as «my own»<sup>7</sup> (*das Eigen*). But, on the other hand, if *Primordialität* designates the

<sup>7</sup> As HUSSERL (1973, pp. 388-389) said: «Habe ich diese Reduktion auf meine Originalsphäre richtig durchgeführt und diese Sphäre selbst durchforscht —als die des mir Eigenen —, so habe ich damit die Welt schlechthin, die für mich als Umwelt und wahre Welt seiende



original nature of origination, starting from it we can direct ourselves from the ordinary to the foundation of origination since «primordial perception» should found any «other perception» —It is at the base of the perceptual moments of derived originality (Husserl 1973, 390). According to the above, the concept of *Primordialität* must be understood—to avoid the assumption of a transcendental world absolutely incommunicable with the natural world— from two previous elements: *first*, as the originality that sends that which is prior the self in the order of givenness, and *second*, as the former itself in the order of foundation. Thus, if *Primordialität* as original or primordial originality designates that which is given by coincidence between givenness and foundation, then it must bring that which is original to the self-givenness of the *ego*.

#### 4. THE FRAGILITY OF THE NOTION OF REALITY

According to the problem of the relationship between the natural and the transcendental, difficulties are to be expected: would original originality, designated by primordiality, not exclude any relation to Life-world? In other words, if the idea of primordiality is only related to the problem of the non-presentative constitution of alterity and to the form of the egological sphere of givenness, practiced at the heart of the experience purified by transcendental reduction, (Husserl 1991; 1950; 1959, 1976) then they would reject each other. This separation would forbid the thought of the socio-cultural, historical and intersubjective concreteness of Life-world, in the terms where natural life lives in its very own naivety. Hence the distinction between primordial world and Life-world would say that the former would respond to the abstract reflection that egology entails and the latter to intersubjective concreteness. The relationship between Life-world and transcendental life would be unapproachable.

So, in order to overcome this problem, it is necessary to resort to transcendental aesthetics. It is inseparable from the approach of the being from the point of imagination and fantasy. This region, in accordance with its particular ontological validity (Bernet 2004), facilitates the possibility of an aesthetic of perceptions based on the imaginary. There upon it will be possible to think of the being as pure manifestation allowing us an ontology of the unreal while recovering and revitalizing the region of the imagination. Due to it, acts of consciousness can cover two or more regions of existence assumed as realities that exceed classical categories where the problem of existence has been dealt with. Its fundamental contribution would accept that the

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ist, reduziert auf das von ihr, was mir original gegeben ist, also auf ein für mich jeweils im besonderen Sinne umweltlich Subjektives» [If I have correctly accomplished this reduction to my original sphere and even explored this sphere—as that of my own— then with it I purely and simply have the world, which is being for me insofar as surrounding world and true world, reduced to that which is given to me originally from it, therefore, to one given to me, respectively, in the special sense of that which is subjective surrounded by the world].

unfolding of that which is given in image would allow to think of the subjective operation as reality in which the world comes to being. If in §§ 22, 24 of the «Sixth Research» imagination and presentation were analyzed in relation to perception, in Hua XXIII (Husserl 1980) the notion of image will be considered beyond the metaphysical dichotomy presence-absence, imagination-absence and fantasy-mental or physical image.

This indicates that in the givenness of the world, in image, the operation of fantasy acquires a realism that works according to what exists in the perception of image; and what is perceived in it, as fallen into an effective perception, would allow to be experienced as a *Dies-da* (a «this-here»), τὸδε τι —conferring to the lexicon used in paragraph 14 of *Ideen I*— which, once delivered to the imagination, serves as building material of censored possibilities for the real thing, achieving its purpose. When the real being is eidetically varied, the *Als-ob* (the «as-if») —a subjective, intentional, free, eidetically solid variation— enters the scene. It is a consistent possibility in subjectivity according to eidetically verifiable principles (that can only be constituted simultaneously with subjectivity). So, if that which is given is eidetically varied beginning with the *Als-ob* then it is possible to explain the origin of being from its phenomenality: if the *Dies-da* is varied by the *Als-ob*, then the origin of being is indiscernible from the logic of manifestation. The *Als-ob* sets the formal conditions so that which is eidetically possible in the *Dies-da* can be accomplished. Therefore, that which is eidetically possible, supported by the variation of the *Als-ob*, announces that what is possible is intelligible according to *Horizontintentionalität*: the horizon opens up to that which is eidetically possible, it is an ideal principle, not a matter of the will of the *ego*.

We thus testify to the fragility of the notion of reality since what is given in the imagination possesses an ontological validity capable of making possible an effective transformation of the surrounding world. All this based on eidetically open horizons, from primordial apprehension and original impression. This is how the positive sense of what pertains phenomenologically to the inadequacy of experience is revealed.

Insofar as subjectivity, witnessed only egologically, it has been described according to its intentional *modus operandi*, the occurrence of the world in image allows the thought of being without subjecting the permanence of that which is real to the terms of μιμησις (imitation); it would also be ποιησις (production). If the being is correlative to a world, before being a falsification of the real world, there would be a being for each world. In such instance, in each possible world that which is real and that which is imaginary would demand mutual complementation according to the correlative ways of being of this or that region. Thus, an ontology of the imaginary shows that the being is not subjected to material appearance, that the designation of materiality, as that which originally belongs to the being, demands a restriction of the possibilities of the *Dies-da*: the real thing would exceed its presence since the event to which it belongs, based on materiality of the *ens*, it is not the last transcendental event. Materiality, according to its consistent eidetic variations (e.g., to the imaginative world of what is given, at the moment of variation), shows itself as that which uniquely fits into the empirical conditions

of a particular appearance, but it would not be the most original nature of the appearance of the being. The world in the image would obtain its own principle of individuation, and intentionality and would affirm itself as the archetypal modality of the consciousness of the image.

##### 5. «LEBENSWELT» AND «TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETICS»

The foregoing must have established that transcendental aesthetics would ensure mediation between *Lebenswelt*, as a world of pure experience, and primordially in general (Farges 2010, 15-34). This mediation could be articulated, on the one hand, if and only if transcendental aesthetics could take charge of the phenomenological distinction between natural and spiritual sciences; a distinction that must be founded by testing a new method for the positive sciences. On the other hand, if the regions of material nature, spiritual nature, and the world of the spirit served as construction material for suspending the validity of the positive sciences, they would do so only to take the distinction of fundamental ontological regions to the description of the *a priori* structures of the pre-theoretical world. Once they are able to take care of their part, we can understand the phenomenological essence of *Lebenswelt*.

So, achieving such understanding requires penetrating fundamental ontological unities to define the thematic domain of the theoretical discipline which can play the leading role in the search for a further description of the transcendental constitution. If both ways agree to an *a priori* stratification of the pre-given world, transcendental aesthetics should help perform the ontological and constitutive analysis of each of these regions<sup>8</sup>. This way, transcendental aesthetics must be initially referred to each *Umwelt*, since the division of the surrounding world into pre-theoretical experiences (Husserl 2001, 152) suggests that there are necessary elements in each world which make it possible to differentiate them from each other. This would point out that the natural being of the *ego* consists of being constituted. If the «nature» region is studied from an *ontology* and, at the same time, from a *systematic phenomenology of the phantasm*, correlative to *transcendental aesthetics*, then the study of the *designation* of this or that appearance sharpens concomitantly with the natural world. The act of designating would help differentiate between surrounding worlds —whether familiar or special ones— as original horizons of thematization (Husserl 2001, 174). This indicates a dual use of the notion of «nature». The first one would answer to the «everything natural in the world» as «totality of coexistent extensive realities». It would be a region of the real world. The second would reside in coextensive nature of what is reality for the self. This is how the essence of what we call the «natural world» is constituted

<sup>8</sup> As HUSSERL (2001, 152) said: in «Grundlinien einer Ontologie und Phänomenologie der physischen Natur» [Basic lines for an ontology and phenomenology of physical nature].

(Husserl 2001, 135-136). These uses, however, require greater attention; we are not dealing with a simple ambivalence, but with the fundamental function of transcendental aesthetics. Here it occupies itself with the description of the world as «world of experience» and thus making it possible for us to think, on one hand, of acts of signification as original ways of unfolding of the natural life (where the being would be given beforehand); and, on the other, the effectiveness of historicity as instituted, sedimented or unceasingly reactivated in the world of natural life, revealing the genetic structure of the world of natural life.

Due to the Husserlian treatment of the natural world as a pure, *a priori*, eidetically invariable concept, situated in the experience arisen in the natural attitude, we are given an ontological thesis where the world is committed. This indicates that the natural concept of the world takes the form of an ontological *a priori* in which it is confirmed that the natural world is that which is ontologically and aprioristically pre-given<sup>9</sup>. This way Husserl can establish that retrocession to the conditions of the givenness of being leads to thinking that material ontology comprises the ontology of nature and that way the final distinction between material ontology and formal ontology becomes effective: where the latter would belong to the set of *a priori* disciplines that constitute the idea of nature<sup>10</sup>. When Husserl makes an *a priori* critique of natural perception in order to philosophically found the positive sciences of nature, (Husserl 1973, 120-138) he must scientifically and ethically broaden the concept of «natural world». But only by aesthetically broadening the givenness of being, can one begin to think of the world as *eidos* of experience as pure and eidetically consistent possibility and, at the same time, as an *a priori* form of the possible world of experience.

## FINDINGS

Solely for the purposes targeted in this study —as outlined at the outset— we will point out two achievements:

First, it was established that transcendental aesthetics is the descriptive ontology of the pre-theoretical Life-world (as it is always pre-given in natural

<sup>9</sup> As HUSSERL (1973, 121) said: «[I]ch nicht nur sicher bin, gerade das und das vorzufinden, sondern auch, das "ich bin" und dass eine Welt ist» [I am not only sure to directly and anticipately find this and that, but also that «I am» and that a world is]; and p. 124: «Natur ist der einheitliche Inbegriff oder vielmehr [...], das gesetzlich einheitliche Ganze alles raumlich-zeitlichen Daseins, also alles dessen, was Ort und Ausbreitung in dem einen Raum hat und Stellung bzw. Dauer in der einen Zeit. Dieses Ganze nennen wir die Welt oder die Allnatur» [Nature is the unitary whole or, rather,...the legitimate unitary whole of all space-time existence, therefore, of all that has place and extension in space and position or duration in a time. We call this the world or nature in its entirety].

<sup>10</sup> As HUSSERL (1973, 135) said: «Die "Ontologie" der Natur entfaltet in ihren Disziplinen den reinen formal- allgemeinen Sinn der natürlichen Thesis oder die Gegebenheit der natürlichen Einstellung als solcher» [The «ontology» of nature develops in its disciplines the purely formal-universal sense of the natural thesis or the givenness of the natural attitude as such].

experience), but also that it is a descriptive ontology of the region of nature (insofar as fundamental region of this same pre-given world). Thus, if the title «natural world» designates the world as it is immediately given as the fundamental and original level of this same world, transcendental aesthetics would encompass both, Life-world as pre-given to experience and characterized by its intuitive immediacy, as well as the sensible world characterized by its fundamental originality. If Life-world is the primordial world as the original foundation of the pre-givenness of experience, transcendental aesthetics would offer «the global systematic form of a possible experience in general» taking charge «of the system of possible experience as my “original experience”» where experience would be brought to fulfillment by the self.

All in all, if transcendental aesthetics should be understood as the static constitution of the world as a unity of effective and possible experience, and as the path of primordial constitution toward intersubjective constitution<sup>11</sup>, then primordiality, as original originality, must be sought after within the field that gives meaning and support to naïve experience, since, according to Husserl's remark: «We cannot say that egological experience is *absolutely original*, [since] original experience, in the broadest of senses, is direct intuition, the direct intuitive caption of mundane realities, relative to the possibilities»<sup>12</sup>. Thus, the association between egological primordiality and relative originality no longer allows us to identify Life-world with egological primordiality: the world is given in an absolute originality independently of egological primordiality and, thus, freed from pure and foundational perception. So natural perception is made independent from the pure egological core by exhibiting the scheme of modification where natural experience is revealed as the most basic mode of subjectivity from which it is possible to conceive the effective transformation of the *ego*.

However, if that which is primordial offers something original, it cannot tell anything about the concrete originality of the world. Life-world is related to primordiality only when it takes the sense of pre-theoretical foundation and as the origin relative to the «scientific world». As Julien Farges points out in «Monde de la vie et primordialité chez Husserl», this would explain why

<sup>11</sup> As HUSSERL said (1930, 61 [a-b]): «Was da universales Thema ist, das ist *die gestammte systematische Form möglicher Erfahrung überhaupt*. Transzendente Aesthetik beschäftigt sich zunächst mit dem System möglicher Erfahrung als *meiner*, des Erfahrenden, “originaler Erfahrung” (primordialer). Und dann in höherer Stufe mit der möglicher Erfahrung des Ich-All, der universalen in möglicher Einverständnisbeziehung stehenden Subjektivität» [What we have here as the universal theme is *the systematic form originated from a possible experience in general*. Transcendental aesthetics is initially concerned with the system of possible experience as *my own*, the one whom experiences, from the «original (primordial) experience». From here on, at a higher level of possible experience, of the whole self, of the relationship of mutual intellection of the subjectivity which remains].

<sup>12</sup> As HUSSERL (1973, 384) said: «Das sagt hier nicht, in egologisch reduziert. Die egologische Erfahrung kann man *absolut original* nennen; die originale im weiteren Sinn ist direkte Anschauung, direct an schauende Erfassung mundaner Wirklichkeiten bzw. Möglichkeiten».

Husserl brought into the *Krisis* originality and originariness, inscribed in Life-world, in order to conceive *Lebenswelt* as primordial world. With this, he could turn it into a correlate corresponding to a formal modality of consciousness (Farges 2010). By becoming «*anschauliche Welt*», «*Lebenswelt*» would not be exhausted in sensibility: it would be a pure pre- and exo-theoretical affliction<sup>13</sup>.

*Lebenswelt* thus becomes the «horizon of a possible experience of things» (Husserl, 1976, 141) from which this horizon is predetermined by the effective operations of the others, their spiritual predications, the sciences which serve them as idealizations, etc., i. e., as *Weltanschauungen*. So all primordial experiences are lived from the world given originally as *Weltanschauung*. Thus *Weltanschauung* and *Lebenswelt* would confirm the «concrete unity of Life-world» as the surplus of the «world of things»<sup>14</sup>. Things from Life-world are no longer merely sensible natural substrates, they are, intersubjectively, units of sense constituted in spiritual predications. This way, *Lebenswelt* supports the historical and cultural world and, at the same time, a world that gives things through these historical-cultural predications. A world of weighed on things by spiritual predications is already a world that offers things based on peculiar meanings. According to this, transcendental aesthetics must be aided by the phenomenology of meaning and by the constitution of the unitary meaning of a peculiar world (Husserl, 1959; 1976; 1992).

Second, an ontology of the world that begins with the analysis of *Weltanschauung* and *Horizontintentionalität* must comprehend an ontology of the intuitive world that is at the base of pure experience. The essence of the natural being is constituted in this unity, without the need to leave the description of pre-philosophical life to *praxis* that's prior even to perception. If primordial perception finds any other perception to deliver perceptual moments from derived originality to intellection, then we have shown that, with the notion of *Primordialität*, Husserl can regard primordial originality as the synthesis of the two types of primitiveness or anteriority. This means that *Originalität* refers back to what takes precedence in us in terms of foundation, whereas *Primordialität* would designate the consciousness between that which belongs to the givenness

<sup>13</sup> As HUSSERL (1976, 141) said: «Wie haben wir die Lebenswelt als ein im voraus feststehendes universales Feld solcher feststellbaren Tatsachen? Sie ist die raumzeitliche Welt der Dinge, so wie wir sie in unserem vor- und außerwissenschaftlichen Leben erfahren und über die erfahrenen hinaus als erfahrbar wissen» [How do we have Life-world as a universally stable field in anticipation to such verifiable facts? It is the world of temporal space of things, just as we experience it in our pre- and exo-theoretical life, furthermore we experience it as long as we know it as experiential].

<sup>14</sup> As HUSSERL (1976, 133) said: «Aber diese wie jede Idealität ändert nichts daran, daß sie menschliche Gebilde sind, auf menschliche Aktualitäten und Potenzialitäten wesensmäßig bezogen, und so doch zu dieser konkreten Einheit der Lebenswelt gehörig, deren Konkretion also weiter reicht als die der "Dinge"» [But this, like any ideality, means nothing else than they are human formations, essentially related to human actualities and potentialities and, therefore, belong to this concrete unity of Life-world, whose very concretion goes beyond than that of «things»].

and that, which corresponds to foundation. Thanks to this, we have been able to say that if Life-world finds consistency in natural perceptions as a practical, everyday and relative to subjectivity world<sup>15</sup>, it is because *Lebenswelt* is the original world as the whole of what is given just as it is given. Its originality would consist of being the foundation of the validity of theoretical idealities of the world of science in general, but also of special exotheoretical worlds (the world of the child, the worker, the individual scientist, etc.). Thus, it would merit the title of foundation of the validity of all special horizons insofar as «the universal *a priori* of the objective-logical side, that of mathematical sciences and all other *a priori* sciences [founded] in a prior universal *apriori* in itself». It would be precisely the *a priori* «of Life-world taken purely»<sup>16</sup>.

*Lebenswelt* is thus the foundation of sense veiled by science in general and the universal *a priori* itself prior to all theories and practices in general. It encompasses and contains that of which it is base, and thus forbids considering its oneness in terms of being a foundation since it is what constitutes the natural being of the *ego* (Husserl, 2002). It would be, prior to all else, the foundation of the validity of the truths of science as it boosts the incorporation of the predicative and the theoretical in its own pretheoretical immediacy. In a few words, *Lebenswelt* would be the place where the theoretical is permanently converted into the pre-theoretical and where the primordial flow is once and again in the constant iteration in which praxis is constituted.

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<sup>15</sup> As HUSSERL (1976, 176) said: «Die Welt des Lebens, die alle praktischen Gebilde (sogar die der objektiven Wissenschaften als Kulturtatsachen, bei Enthaltung von der Teilnahme an ihren Interessen) ohne weiteres in sich aufnimmt, ist freilich in stetem Wandel der Relativitäten auf Subjektivität bezogen. Aber wie immer sie sich wandelt und wie immer sie korrigiert wird, sie hält ihre wesensgesetzliche Typik ein, an der alles Leben und so alle Wissenschaft, deren "Boden" sie ist, gebunden bleibt. So hat sie auch eine aus reiner Evidenz zu schöpfende Ontologie» [The world of living which, embraces within itself, without question, every practical formation (including those of the objective sciences as facts of the culture, by abstaining from partitioning of their interests), it is clearly related to the constant change of relativities proper of subjectivity. But, as always, it is transformed and as always corrected, it fulfills its essential typology, in which all life and thus all science, which are grounded in it, are founded. Thus, it also has an ontology drawn from pure evidence].

<sup>16</sup> As HUSSERL (1976, 144) said: «[Das universale Apriori der objektiv-logischen Stufe —das der mathematischen und aller sonstigen im gewöhnlichen Sinne apriorischen Wissenschaften— in einem an sich früheren universalen A priori, eben dem der reinen Lebenswelt, gründet» [The universal *a priori* of the objective-logical level —that of mathematics and any other *a priori* science in the usual sense— is founded on a former universal *a priori* itself, precisely that of the pure Life-world].

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