FOUR KINDS OF INTENTION: ACTUAL, HABITUAL, VIRTUAL, AND INTERPRETATIVE[*]

SYDNEY PENNER
Asbury University, Wilmore, KY (USA)

«There has been a great deal of super-subtle dividing of intentions into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative; but if you are going to take your stand on logic you must be ready to face a logical conclusion.» – Mr. Ogilvie in Sir Compton MacKenzie's novel *The Altar Steps*[1]

ABSTRACT: Suárez distinguishes between four different ways of intending an end of action: actually, virtually, habitually, and interpretatively. This distinction comes to be repeated in scores of books and articles in subsequent centuries as a standard part of action theory, and Suárez is evidently the source for many of the later authors. This paper examines Suárez's treatment of the distinction. Interpretative intention receives the most attention, since Suárez appears to give several inconsistent characterizations of it in different works. The paper ends with some notes about the subsequent reception of the distinction and reflects briefly on the lessons to be drawn about tracing Suárez's influence.

KEY WORDS: Suárez; intention; actual intention; virtual intention; habitual intention; interpretative intention.

Cuatro tipos de intención: actual, habitual, virtual e interpretativa

RESUMEN: Suárez distingue entre cuatro formas diferentes de intentar un fin de acción: con una intención actual, virtual, habitual o interpretativa. Esta distinción se repite en muchos libros y artículos en siglos posteriores como una parte estándar de la teoría de la acción, y Suárez es evidentemente la fuente de muchos de los autores posteriores. Este artículo examina el tratamiento de Suárez de la distinción. La intención interpretativa recibe la mayor atención, ya que Suárez parece dar varias caracterizaciones inconsistentes de ella en diferentes obras. El artículo concluye con algunas notas sobre la posterior recepción de la distinción y comenta brevemente las lecciones que se deben aprender sobre cómo rastrear la influencia de Suárez.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Suárez; intención; intención actual; intención virtual; intención habitual; intención interpretativa.

Dozens of textbooks and lexicons of moral philosophy from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries list four kinds of intention and provide brief characterizations of them, but with little explanation of just how to understand the distinction or what motivates it. Some of the textbooks tell short stories to illustrate the distinction in the context of a specific situation. Here is one such

---

[1]   (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922), 240.

story, courtesy of Charles Coppens in *A Brief Text-book of Moral Philosophy*, a book setting out the «system of Ethics taught in Catholic Colleges, Seminaries and Universities… based on the philosophy of Aristotle»[2]:

> A boy is sent by his father to assist a distressed family. He sets out with the *actual* intention of fulfilling this commission. While walking along, he is occupied with other thoughts and is unmindful of his message, yet he directs his steps aright in virtue of his former intention—that is, with a *virtual* intention. He may delay for hours at a friend's house, totally uninfluenced by the purpose for which he started out; nevertheless, as that purpose has not been given up, it remains as a habit; it is *habitual*. At last he reaches the distressed family, and finds them in such want that he feels confident that his father, if he knew the circumstances, would wish him to give a larger alms than the sum appointed. Accordingly he gives this larger alms, acting on his father's intention as he interprets it. This is the father's *interpretative* intention—i.e., what he would have actually intended if he had known the facts[3].

There are variations among the texts in how the four kinds of intention are characterized, but widespread agreement about the number of kinds and about their names: actual, habitual, virtual, and interpretative. Several questions might be asked about this division. Where did it originate? Aquinas starts to distinguish between different kinds of intention, but he does not provide a fourfold division. The source must be later. In what context was the division first proposed? What motivates it?

There are too many unread texts to tell a conclusive story about the origins of this fourfold division, but the origin may lie in Francisco Suárez's work. He certainly plays a key role in making this division standard for the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts. Many of them direct readers to Suárez as a source of the doctrine; some are more or less verbatim excerpts from Suárez[4].

In this paper, I will examine Suárez's account of the four kinds of intention. After briefly looking at some earlier divisions in Suárez's predecessors, I will examine his treatment of each of the four kinds of intention in turn. Interpretative intention receives the most attention, since it turns out that Suárez offers quite different characterizations of it in different places. I will end with some observations on the subsequent history of this doctrine and reflect on some lessons to be drawn about tracing Suárez's influence on modern philosophy.

1. Predecessors

One source for later scholastic discussions of intention such as Suárez's is Thomas Aquinas's comment that the force (*virtus*) of an intention can remain

---

[2]   (New York: Schwartz, Kirwin, and Fauss, 1895), 3.
[3]   *A Brief Text-book*, 13.
[4]   I do not, however, wish to suggest that all of these texts present perfectly the same account of the fourfold division. They do not. In particular, one should not assume that Coppens' story perfectly reflects the account we are going to see in Suárez.

even after the agent has ceased considering the end to which the intention is directed. The broader context for Aquinas's comment is his series of arguments in the opening of the Prima Secundae of his *Summa theologiae* (henceforth, *ST*) for the conclusion that all human beings in all their actions act for the sake of the ultimate end[5]. Suárez's main discussion of the four kinds of intention appears in a similar context, so it is worth examining what Aquinas says in more detail.

If not interpreted with some care, Aquinas's conclusion is quite implausible, especially if we remember that he thinks our ultimate end is God. Is it really the case that every action of every human being is performed for that end? Objections easily come to mind, as they did to Aquinas's medieval critics. Some people think that their ultimate end is pleasure and do whatever they can to achieve as much of it as possible. Some people do love God but also love other things and sometimes choose other things even when they know that doing so is contrary to God's will. Even the most devout often do things with nary a thought for how doing so might or might not contribute to their end of knowing and loving God. Furthermore, people often do things that involve no thought of any sort, e.g., idly scratching one's beard. So we might conclude that easily available knowledge of how human beings in fact act shows Aquinas's claim to be false.

Aquinas, of course, makes clear that his conclusion is to be interpreted with some philosophical nuance. There are three general ways to attenuate his conclusion: (1) limit what counts as a human action, (2) broaden what counts as the relevant ultimate end, and (3) broaden what puts an agent into the right sort of relationship with the ultimate end to count as acting for its sake. All three strategies have been employed in defending Aquinas's conclusion, including by Aquinas himself[6].

The third strategy is the one relevant for present purposes, since it is where different kinds of intention come into play. After arguing that human beings have one and only one ultimate end, Aquinas asks whether an agent wills everything that she wills for that ultimate end[7]. The Third Argument for the negative answer relies on the premise that considering or thinking about an end is necessary to ordering something to that end. For example, for it to be the case that I went hiking to please my wife, I must have been thinking about pleasing my wife at the time. But, the argument continues, people are

---

not constantly thinking about the ultimate end, so it cannot be the case that everything they will and do is for the sake of the ultimate end[8].

Aquinas responds by denying that one has to consider an end at the time of acting in order for that action to be for the sake of the end:

> It is not necessary that one always consider the ultimate end whenever one desires or does something. Rather, the force of the first intention, which is directed to the ultimate end, remains in any desire of whatever thing, even if one is not actually considering the ultimate end, just as it is not necessary to consider the end at every step when going on a journey[9].

We can distinguish a negative and a positive claim here. The negative claim is that it is not necessary to think about the end while acting in order for that action to have been done for the sake of the end. The negative claim is clearly right, as his example persuasively illustrates. It is not necessary for someone who is walking to a destination to think about the destination at every step for every step to have been taken for the sake of getting to the destination. This point is frequently cited in defences of Aquinas's account and justifiably so, for it succeeds in diffusing a certain obvious—albeit rather crude—objection[10]. That is, if the critic of Aquinas's account thinks to have shown that we do not always act for the sake of an ultimate end because we sometimes act without thinking about an ultimate end, then it is enough for the defender to show that it is false that thinking about an ultimate end during an action is a necessary condition for that action to have been done for the sake of that ultimate end.

But if occurrent consideration of an end is not necessary for an action to be for the sake of that end, what alternative condition makes it the case that the action is done for the sake of that end? The suggested positive claim seems to be that the necessary condition is that there have been an actual intention of the end at some point, the force (*virtus*) of which remains in the agent (and which force comes to be called a virtual intention). What makes it the case that every step on the way to Rome was taken for the sake of the end of getting to Rome was that the agent had decided to go to Rome before setting out. Once that intention has been set, its force continues to result in the external actions needed to get to Rome. There is no need to constantly think about the end while executing the means.

---

[8]   *ST* IaIIae.1.6 arg. 3: «*Praeterea, quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine. Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum finem*».

[9]   *ST* IaIIae.1.6 ad 3: «*Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitet de fine*». All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. In the case of Aquinas, I use the Latin texts at http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html.

[10]   For example, in: IRWIN, T., *The Development of Ethics*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), §§ 248 and 361; MACDONALD, «Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning»,″ 38; and MCCLUSKEY, C., «Happiness and Freedom in Aquinas's Theory of Action», *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 9 (2000): 78.

This seems an entirely plausible response for the example under discussion. It is less clear that the appeal to a force remaining from actual intentions suffices to handle other putative counterexamples to Aquinas's claim that all human actions are done for the sake of the ultimate end. Can it plausibly be said that every time we act we previously thought about the ultimate end, intended it, and that some of that force remains to cause our action? Do we not sometimes act unreflectively without ever considering how the actions in question do or do not lead to our ultimate end?[11] What about actions that in fact lead away from one's ultimate end rather than toward it?

Perhaps questions like these in part motivated later scholastic efforts to develop a more refined account of different kinds of intention. According to Ignatius Theodore Eschmann, Aquinas's reference to a force lingering from an earlier intention gave «rise to the major scholastic dispute» concerning the article in which it is embedded[12]. There are other passages where Aquinas talks about non-actual intention, using both the terms «virtual» and «habitual». Unfortunately, he does not appear to be consistent in how he uses these terms[13]. Suárez at one point complains that Aquinas confuses his terminology and fails to make a satisfactory distinction between the different kinds of intention[14]. Such inconsistencies may also have spurred further refinements.

One further development should be noted before turning to Suárez's account. Aquinas uses three of the terms («actual», «habitual», and «virtual») that become part of the standard fourfold distinction, albeit not consistently and not with a detailed account of what they mean. If we turn to Scotus, however, we see him complaining that a twofold distinction between actual and habitual intention is commonly made as if it were a sufficient division. Scotus

---

[11]   Cf. the following remarks from ANSCOMBE, G. E. M.: «Can't a man just do what he does, a great deal of the time? He may or may not have a reason or a purpose; and if he has a reason or purpose, it in turn may just be what he happens to want; why demand a reason or purpose for *it*? and why must we at last arrive at some *one* purpose that has an intrinsic finality about it?» (*Intention*, 2nd ed. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000], § 21).

[12]   *The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two Courses* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997), 138. Aquinas's article in question is, of course, *ST* IaIIae.1.6.

[13]   I cover Aquinas's inchoate and not entirely consistent distinctions between different kinds of intention in more detail in Appendix A of my dissertation: «Francisco Suárez on Acting for the Sake of the Ultimate End» (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2011), 202-25. See also two older works: SIMONIN, H., «La Notion d'Intentio dans l'Oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin», *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 19 (1930): 445-63, and ROBERT SKRZYPCZAK, R. E., «Actual, Virtual, and Habitual Intention in St. Thomas Aquinas» (master's thesis, Loyola University Chicago, 1958).

[14]   *De fine hominis* 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24). Citations of Suárez include a reference to the relevant volume and page numbers in the *Opera omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1856-78). For *De fine hominis*, *De voluntario et involuntario*, and *De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum*, Latin quotations will be taken from *Tractatus quinque theologici ad Primam Secundae D. Thomae* (Lugduni: sumptibus Iacobi Cardon, 1628), with some minor standardizations of spellings and abbreviations expanded. The Vivès *Opera omnia* is more widely used and offers a usable text, but it is less reliable than the 1628 edition. For *De sacramentis*, I relied on the Vivès *Opera omnia*.

himself thinks it is not sufficient and recommends adding virtual intention as a third member, which he proceeds to distinguish sharply from the other two members[15]. Scotus's distinction then appears to become standard among later scholastic theologians and philosophers, though I do not wish to dwell on that history here. For present purposes, it is enough to note that three kinds of intention are part of the standard conceptual repertoire by Suárez's time.

What about the fourth member, interpretative intention? Is it original to Suárez or did any of his predecessors make use of the notion? The answer is not entirely clear. According to Suárez's introduction to the four intentions in *De fine hominis*, «it is said that a human being acts for the sake of the end either habitually, actually, virtually, or only interpretatively»[16]. The phrase «it is said» suggests that he is repeating a distinction already made by others. Yet Suárez goes on to cite primarily Aquinas, who does not make this fourfold distinction. Of course, as we already saw, the theory of different kinds of intention developed after Aquinas. It might well have continued developing in the centuries between Scotus and Suárez.

That said, Suárez is usually the consummate scholar, citing the views of many of his predecessors, so the relative paucity of citations in his discussion of ways of intending is striking. He cites no one when discussing interpretative intention. This might suggest that he is not borrowing from an earlier author.

Furthermore, I have yet to find any earlier figure who discusses interpretative intention. Durand of Saint-Pourçain might be thought to come close to talking about interpretative intention, since he does on several occasions mention interpretative willing. But it appears that he has a quite different notion in mind for use in other contexts[17]. My not having found an earlier figure discussing interpretative intention is not conclusive, of course. The couple of centuries prior to Suárez produced a massive number of philosophical and theological texts, but very few areas of philosophy are as unknown to us as the scholastic philosophy of these centuries. Inferring an absence of something merely from the fact that we do not know of its presence would be irresponsible.

Nonetheless, given that I have yet to find earlier discussions of interpretative intention and given that, as we will soon see, Suárez seems unsure about how to articulate what it is, it is tempting to think that he is introducing the notion. The temptation is only strengthened by observing the number of later works that refer back to Suárez when discussing the distinction. These citations suggest that Suárez's discussion is seminal in some way. I will, however, now leave this origins question aside and simply proceed to look at Suárez's account of intending ends.

---

[15]   *Ordinatio* IV, dist. 6, q. 6.

[16]   *De fine hominis* 2.4.1 (= OO 4:24): «*Dicitur enim homo operari propter finem vel habitualiter, vel actualiter, vel virtualiter, vel tantum interpretative…*»

[17]   See *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII* (Venetiis: ex typographia Guerrae, 1571), II.30.2-3, IV.4.7, and IV.6.4. My thanks to Peter John Hartman for providing me with these references. Durandus also talks of interpretative deliberation (II.24.6).

2. The Four Intentions in Suárez

Suárez notes that the term «intention» is used in a variety of ways in philosophy, and emphasizes that the intentions referred to in treatments of human action should not be confused with other kinds of intentions[18]. He provides a little etymological story, according to which «intention» («*intentio*») comes from the Latin verb «*intendere*,» which means to aim at something or to tend to something (*in aliud tendere*)[19]. But, unsurprisingly, this metaphor finds application in a variety of areas:

> From this etymology, the name «intention» has various significations: for both the attention of the mind and the application of the senses are customarily signified and sometimes inanimate things are said to intend their ends[20].

When talking about human action, however, we are only talking about that sort of intention which is «a certain free or perfectly voluntary tendency to some end, which is proper to things having use of reason»[21]. This restriction to intentions arising intrinsically from the agent is relevant to the question of whether all human beings have the same ultimate end. Suárez thinks it clear that the «author of nature» has established an ultimate end for humans and that those actions which do not come from a deliberated will are done for the sake of this end in the same sense that natural agents are said to act for the sake of the ends appointed for them by God[22]. But in ethics we are interested in those intentions by which agents themselves order their actions[23].

A question arises about what the difference is between willing and intention, given that both are acts of the will that have an end as object. Suárez replies that the end can be thought of under two aspects. The end thought of as a good that is lovable for its own sake is the object of willing. But the end thought of as a good that ought to be sought out via means is the object of an intention. This crucial involvement of means is evident when we note that the core cases

---

[18]   I should note that Johannes Brachtendorf covers much of the same material as I will be discussing in this section and its several subsections in his paper «Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez: eine spätscholastische Kritik an Thomas von Aquins Lehre vom Letztziel des Menschen», *Theologie und Philosophie* 76 (2001): 530-50, but I will omit constant citations of his paper. Our readings of Suárez are by and large in agreement. The most notable difference is that I look at Suárez's putatively inconsistent accounts of interpretative intention in several works, while Brachtendorf only looks at the discussion in *De fine hominis*. The significance of that will become clear later.

[19]   Cf. Aquinas, *ST* IaIIae.12.1 co.

[20]   *De voluntario et involuntario* (henceforth, *DVI*) 6.1.2 (=OO 4:242): «… *ex qua etymologia nomen* intentionis *varias habet significationes; nam et mentis attentionem, et sensuum applicationem significare solet, et interdum res inanimes dicuntur intendere suos fines*».

[21]   *DVI* 6.1.2 (=OO 4:242): «… *quamdam liberam, vel perfecte voluntariam tendentiam in aliquem finem; quae propria est rei utentis ratione…*»

[22]   *DFH* 2.3.3-4 and 3.1.proem.-3 (=OO 4:22-23 and 25-27).

[23]   Cf. Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 22, art. 1.

of intention are cases in which we are considering how to achieve the end. From this distinction between the two aspects of the end, we can also learn that intentions can be only of ends that have not yet been achieved, since an end that has been achieved has no need of being sought out via means. Willings, however, can also be of ends already achieved[24]. So willing and intention are not the same, according to Suárez[25].

2.1.   Texts and Context

Suárez brings up the fourfold distinction in at least three texts: *De fine hominis* (henceforth, *DFH*)[26], *De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum* (henceforth, *DBM*)[27], and *De sacramentis in genere* (henceforth, *DS*)[28]. The first two works are based on lectures that Suárez gave in the 1580s in Rome and only published posthumously, while *DS* was first published in 1595.

In *DFH*, as one might expect from the title, the context is similar to the one in which we find Aquinas's reference to a force remaining from an earlier intention. Suárez has also been discussing ends and about acting for their sake. Before embarking on a series of questions about whether there always is an ultimate end for human actions and whether there can ever be more than one ultimate end[29], Suárez devotes a section to the question of how many ways there are to act for the sake of an end. He then proceeds to discuss the four kinds of intention, evidently identifying the different ways of acting for an end with different ways of intending an end.

In *DBM* and *DS* the contexts are different. In *DBM*, he is asking what kind of relation to the end is required for an interior act of the will to have the goodness that comes from having a good end. Finally, in *DS*, he is asking what sort of intention a priest needs to have in order to confect a sacrament. To borrow some terminology from J. L. Austin, the latter is a question akin to asking about the felicity conditions for a class of performatives[30]. The variety of contexts in which Suárez brings up the different kinds of intention shows that this is supposed to be a theoretically useful distinction; it is not merely an *ad hoc* fix for one particular problem.

---

[24]   *DVI* 6.1.4 (=OO 4:242). Cf. AQUINAS, *ST* IaIIae.12.1 ad 4.

[25]   Suárez does, however, conclude that it is probably the case that desire (*desiderium*) and intention are the same (*DVI* 6.1.8 [=OO 4:243]).

[26]   *DFH* 2.4 (=OO 4:24-25). This is the text discussed by Brachtendorf in «Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez.»

[27]   *DBM* 6.5 (=OO 4:368-71).

[28]   *DS* 13.3 (= OO 20:249-55). My thanks to Michael Barnwell for drawing my attention to this last text. He discusses Suárez's distinction in *The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue* (Leiden: BRILL, 2010), 222-44, and «Voluntary Inconsideration, Virtual Cognition, and Francisco Suárez», *Southwest Philosophical Studies* 31 (2009): 9-14.

[29]   *DFH* 3.

[30]   Cf. AUSTIN's Γ.1 felicity condition (*How to Do Things with Words* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975], 15).

The three accounts do result in a difficulty for readers. While all three texts provide similar accounts of the first three kinds of intention (actual, habitual, and virtual), they diverge in their treatments of interpretative intention. In fact, each account looks incompatible with each of the other two. So in the following discussion I will focus on the *DFH* account for the first three kinds on grounds that it is safe to focus on one text in these cases, but will take each text in turn for interpretative intention since in this case it would not be prudent to rely on one text and assume that its account can be applied elsewhere.

2.2. Actual Intention

Suárez does not say much about this kind of intention, but some of what is required for an actual intention will become clearer once we see what is distinctive about the other kinds. Presumably the sort of intention that is in mind is the sort exemplified by the intentions we have in paradigm instances of deliberation followed promptly by the actions that are to help us achieve our intended ends, e.g., the intention to get a job that one has when deliberating about how to get a job and sending a résumé to a prospective employer. Here is how Suárez characterizes it:

> It is called «actually» when the will acts for the sake of the end because it is actually moved by the end, for which reason an actual cognition and thought about the end itself is especially required for this way of acting, because, unless it is actually apprehended, an end cannot actually move. Next is required an actual motion of the will, either to the end itself or to something else for the sake of it, because this signifies an actual action for the sake of the end[31].

This by itself is not terribly helpful, since the conditions identified sound rather like the standard account of final causation we could have gleaned from Disputation 1 of *DFH*[32]. First, cognition of an end is a necessary condition for final causation. Secondly, the way ends move is by drawing the will, by eliciting action from the will. In other words, in order for there to be an action for the sake of an end, the will has to move toward that end, and in order for the will to move toward that end, the intellect has to cognize the end and so present it to the will. So what we see in the above passage are just a couple of the minimal conditions necessary for action for the sake of an end. If the other kinds of intention fail to meet these conditions, then it is difficult to see how they have

---

[31]   *DFH* 2.4.1 (=OO 4:24): «*Actualiter dicitur voluntas operari propter finem quando actu movetur a fine, unde ad hunc modum operandi imprimis requiritur actualis cognitio, et cogitatio de ipso fine, quia nisi sit actualiter apprehensus, non potest actualiter movere. Deinde requiritur actualis motio voluntatis vel in ipsum finem, vel in alium propter ipsum, quia hoc significat actualis operatio propter finem*».

[32]   In addition, one may consult *Disputationes metaphysicae* 23 for Suárez's account of final causation. Two recent works on his account are my «Final Causality: Suárez on the Priority of Final Causation», in *Suárez on Aristotelian Causality,* ed. Jakob Leth Fink (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 121-48, and Schmid, S., «Finality without Final Causes? Suárez's Account of Natural Teleology», *Ergo* 2 (2015).

any chance of grounding a final causal relation. As we will see, Suárez does not think that they all will be enough to ground such relations, at least not directly. But neither is he willing to grant that none of them do.

Suárez also offers the following characterization in *DS* with the example of a priest saying the words of the institution of the Eucharist in mind:

> [F]or [actual intention] consists in this, that a willing to make the sacrament is actually elicited at the same time that it is made externally[33].

If this is understood as saying that the elicited act of will has to be in act or actual at the time of the external action, then this characterization adds nothing to what we already saw. If it is understood as saying that the *moment* of eliciting the act of will has to be simultaneous with the external action, then it would add something but at the expense of an implausibly strong condition[34].

In Aquinas's example of the traveller walking to a destination, the point is that one need not always actively consider an end in order to act for its sake. An actual intention requires such consideration of the end, but virtual intention does not. Suárez follows Aquinas on this point, as will become clearer in the section on virtual intention.

This might seem puzzling. After all, intention is an act of will while consideration sounds like an act of intellect[35]. So why could there not be an actual intention regardless of what acts there might happen to be in the intellect? Will and intellect are closely related powers of the soul, however, and Suárez thinks acts of the will depend on corresponding acts of the intellect. The will would be blind without cognitive acts. Acts of the will such as love, intention, and choice require that the intellect cognize the relevant objects. One might still wonder if the act of will could not outlast the cognitive act on which it relied, but neither Aquinas nor Suárez appear to grant that possibility.

Hence, in order for an intention to be actual, the agent must simultaneously consider or be aware of the end to which the intention is directed. Once the agent stops considering the end, the intention ceases to be actual.

We may, then, characterize acting with an actual intention in the following way:

> An agent performs an action *A* with an actual intention for an end *E* iff at the time she performs *A* she both (i) considers *E* and (ii) intends *E*.

Note, by the way, that what is required is awareness of the end. There is no indication that awareness of the intention is required, which would be a further

---

[33]   *DS* 13.3.3 (=OO 20:250): «… *consistit enim in hoc, quod actu eliciatur voluntas faciendi sacramentum, eo tempore, quo exterius fit*».

[34]   For readers who noticed the use of the word «willing» («*voluntas*») here, Suárez evidently at least sometimes uses the term in a broad sense that encompasses intention rather than in a mutually exclusive sense.

[35]   That intention is simply an act of will is not universally held by scholastic philosophers, but Suárez explicitly affirms that it is in *DVI* 6.1.3 (=OO 4:242). Cf. Aquinas, *ST* IaIIae.12.1 and *De veritate* q. 22, art. 1.

reflexive act[36]. There is, in fact, reason to think that Suárez would reject such a requirement. Suárez recognizes that we can attend to things and will things without being aware of so doing. At one point, he responds to an objection that relies on inferring the absence of such acts from our not experiencing them:

> It is responded that that attention is very weak and relaxed, and does not include the reflection by which we notice that we attend or that we will. And, for that reason, although it really is there, as the external effect proves, we, nevertheless, do not experience it in itself while it remains nor can we recall it after it is completed nor can we discern whether we had it[37].

Though he is not talking about awareness of intentions here, Suárez clearly recognizes in general the plausible point that agents can have acts of will that they fail to notice.

If it is possible to have an actual intention without being aware of it, one might start worrying that the motivation for other kinds of intention is undercut. Perhaps all putative cases of other kinds of intention are in fact just cases of actual intentions of which the agents are unaware. This worry can be addressed at least in part by noting that on Suárez's account of actual intention, consideration of the end is a necessary condition. Therefore, we have reason to doubt the presence of an actual intention to the extent that we have reason to doubt that an agent is considering the end. Whether an agent is considering an end or not is not an entirely straightforward matter either, since presumably one can consider an end without being aware that one is considering the end. Nonetheless, if someone is walking to a destination and is attentively thinking about other things, it seems entirely reasonable to conclude that she is not still considering her end.

2.3. Habitual intention

Suárez starts his discussion of habitual action for an end by noting that there are different explanations of this kind of acting[38]. He also complains, with some justice, that Aquinas seems to talk about this way of acting, but fails to distinguish it satisfactorily from other ways[39]. Given that Suárez makes these observations, one might expect him to provide a clear account of habitual intention so as to clear up these difficulties. He is, however, not as clear as might be hoped. I suspect that this is because he inherits this member of the division from his predecessors but is not convinced of its usefulness, at least for his purposes. I will say more about this later.

---

[36]   For more on Suárez's view on how we become aware of our own mental acts, see Dominik Perler's excellent study, «Suárez on Consciousness», *Vivarium* 52 (2014): 261-86.

[37]   *DS* 13.3.5 (=OO 20:252): «*Respondetur, illam attentionem esse valde debilem et remissam, et non includere reflexionem, qua advertamus, nos attendere aut velle; et ideo, licet revera sit, ut exterior effectus probat, nos tamen illam in se non experimur, quamdiu durat, nec, postquam transacta est, recordari aut dijudicare possumus, an illam habuerimus*».

[38]   *DFH* 2.4.2 (=OO 4:24).

[39]   *DFH* 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24).

I noted earlier that Scotus takes the distinction between actual and habitual intention to be the common distinction. Taking this as our clue, we might infer that this twofold division came first and, further, that it simply reflects the widespread division between acts and habits or dispositions. An agent can have an occurrent intention to an end and she can have a disposition or inclination to form such occurrent intentions. Insofar as we are familiar with this distinction from a range of other applications, it is not surprising that it occurred to moral psychologists to make the distinction with respect to intention. I take both of the alternative accounts of habitual intention that Suárez mentions to be variations of this one[40]. Ignoring the variations for the moment, we can posit the following as our characterization of habitual intention:

> An agent performs action *A* with a habitual intention for an end *E* iff at the time she performs *A*: (i) she is disposed to form an actual intention for *E* [but (ii) does not actually, virtually, or interpretatively intend *E*].

If the term is supposed to exclude the other kinds of intention, then (ii) is needed in the characterization. If, alternatively, one prefers to think of a habitual intention as persisting through the occasional actual intentions it gives rise to, then one will wish to omit (ii).

On one variant account of habitual action, what is supposed to be happening is that the person acting has inclined herself or her will to some end but performs an action for a different end:

> But not everyone explains in the same way what acting habitually is. Some explain it by reason of a certain accompaniment of a habit accompanying the activity in the same willing or subject, so that it is said that a human acts habitually for the sake of some end when he acts for the sake of some object while retaining a habit inclining to another end, although the relation of this habit in no way ends in action of this kind nor refers it to the end of these, but only [refers] the human or acting will itself.… It is explained by example: for in this way it is commonly said that the just person, even while he sins venially, habitually acts for the sake of God, not because the work of sin itself is referred by that to God, but because at the same time with that work he retains a habitual relation of the person himself or his will to God as ultimate end and because the work by itself does not exclude this relation. And in the same way the infidel who habitually has an idol as the end, even while he performs an honest work of justice and mercy, is said to act habitually for the sake of the idol[41].

---

[40]   If they are variations of what is fundamentally the same account, it is not surprising that in most contexts where habitual intention comes up, Suárez does not bother to distinguish between the two variations.

[41]   *DFH* 2.4.2 (=OO 4:24): «*Quid vero sit operari habitualiter, non omnes eodem modo exponunt: aliqui hoc explicant ratione cujusdam concomitantiae habitus concomitantis operationem in eadem voluntate, seu subjecto, ita ut dicatur homo operari habitualiter propter aliquem finem, quando operatur propter aliquod objectum retinendo habitum inclinantem ad alium finem, quamvis relatio hujus habitus nullo modo cadat in hujusmodi operationem, nec referat illam in horum finem, sed solum ipsum hominem, seu voluntatem operantem.… quod exemplo explicatur: nam hoc modo dici solet iustus, etiam dum venialiter peccat, habitualiter*

It is a crucial feature of this account that the action itself is not ordered to the former end, i.e., to the end to which the agent is ordered. In fact, the action may not even be suitable to being so ordered. In the standard example of a just person who sins venially, the just person has ordered herself to God but, nevertheless, commits a venial sin that is not itself ordered to God and is not a suitable kind of action to be ordered to God. Yet, so the story goes, the just person still carries the habit that orders her to God. For that reason, we can say that the act of sinning was habitually done for the sake of God. As Brachtendorf parses this, the will of the just person still has a fundamental orientation to God, even though that orientation fails to find expression in the act of sin[42] Suárez thinks that Aquinas had this sort of habitual intention in mind in *ST* IaIIae.88.1 ad 2 and IIaIIae.24.10.

Suárez, however, deems this variation irrelevant for talking about action on grounds that the habitual relation in question fails even to have the action as one of its terms. The habit only relates the person or the person's will to God, rather than relating the action to God:

> From these examples and from the matter itself it is clear that this way is very improper, because... this habitual relation does not end in the work itself, because neither through the present act nor through some preceding [act] is an action of this kind referred to that end, nor does it take some entity, either a physical or moral property, from that. Indeed, in no way is it ever referable to that end, as is clear concerning the venial [sin]. Therefore, that entire habitual relation [is] of the subject alone. Hence, it is better to say that he acts with a habitual relation to such an end than that he acts, strictly speaking, for the sake of such an end[43].

Suárez thinks it would be better to say that the person commits a sin while having a habitual relation to God rather than saying that the action itself was habitually done for the sake of God.

Suárez's criticism here might seem puzzling. As he presents it, the crucial problem with habitual intention is that it is the person that is the subject of the

---

operari propter Deum, non quia ipsum opus peccati ab eo referatur in Deum, sed quia simul cum illo opere retinet habitualem relationem ipsius personae, vel voluntatis in Deum ut finem ultimum, et quia opus ex se non excludit hanc relationem, atque eodem modo infidelis, qui habitualiter habet idolum pro fine, etiam dum facit opus honestum iustitiae, et misericordiae, dicetur habitualiter operari propter idolum».

[42]   «Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez», 533: «*Der sündige Gerechte handle zwar nicht aktuell, aber doch habituell im Blick auf Gott, insofern die grundsätzliche Ausrichtung des Willens auf Gott in ihm bestehen bleibe, auch wenn sie die konkrete Handlung nicht bestimme»*.

[43]   *DFH* 2.4.2 (=OO 4:24): «*Ex quibus exemplis et ex re ipsa constat hunc modum esse valde improprium, quia... haec habitualis relatio non cadit in ipsum opus, quia nec per actum praesentem, nec per aliquem praecedentem refertur hujusmodi actus in illum finem, nec ab illo sumit aliquam entitatem, vel proprietatem physicam, vel moralem; imo nullo modo interdum referibilis est in illum finem, ut constat de veniali: ergo tota illa relatio habitualis solius subjecti, unde potius potest dici operari cum relatione habituali ad talem finem, quam operari proprie propter talem finem»*.

relation rather than the action. But this seems to be true of actual intention as well. The person, not the action, actually intends the end. So why the problem with habitual intention? I take the problem to be that a habitual intention does not figure in the action's etiology. That is the sense in which the action is not related to the end. Actual intentions, however, do figure in actions' etiology and thereby relate the actions to the relevant ends.

Since the first account is problematic, at least for present purposes, Suárez says «this habitual relation is explained in another way»[44]. What is not clear, though, is whether Suárez is just reporting the motivation for the second account or whether he is himself affirming it.

Initially it appears that the second account says that there is something remaining from a previous act that serves to relate the current action to the same end:

> Therefore, this habitual relation is explained in another way, since it is thought to be something remaining from some preceding act, through which that work either in particular or at least under a generality is related to such an end, although when that work happens the preceding act or relation in no way is, neither actually nor in some force (so that having that left it could through it influence the work), but merely habitually. This is because that intention, once a habit, was not retracted. For example, when someone who had at the end of the morning referred every work of God to God, but afterwards in thinking of God does something referable of itself to God, yet without that memory of his prior intention and without any actual or virtual influx, then that human being is said to act habitually on account of God, on account of a remaining relation of habit having been held from a prior intention and not having been retracted[45].

On this characterization, the action itself is related in some way to the end, rather than only the person being related to the end as with the previous account. The idea seems to be that if one forms an intention for an end, then something of that intention can remain as long as the intention is not retracted. Suárez uses the example of someone who in the morning intends to perform every work for the glory of God but who during the day acts without any thought of her former intention or of God. Notice that her subsequent actions are supposed to be consonant with her original intention; this is what distinguishes this case from the previous one of the just person who sins. Despite the fact that the intention

---

[44]   *DFH* 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24).
[45]   *DFH* 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24): «*Alio ergo modo explicatur haec relatio habitualis, quando censetur relicta ex aliquo actu praecedenti, per quem illud opus vel in particulari, vel saltem sub generalitate relatum est in talem finem, licet quando fit illud opus praecedens actus, seu relatio, nullo modo sit nec actualiter, nec in aliqua virtute, quam reliquerit ut per eam influat in opus, sed mere habitualiter; quia illa intentio semel habita retractata non fuit; ut verbi gratia retulit quis summo mane omnia opera Dei in Deum, postea vero in discursu Dei operatur aliquid referibile de se in Deum, tamen sine illa memoria prioris intentionis, et sine ullo influxu actuali, vel virtuali, tunc dicitur ille homo habitualiter operari propter Deum, propter relationem habitu relictam ex priori intentione habita, et non retractata*».

formed in the morning no longer causally contributes to the actions, the claim is that we can still say that her actions are done for the glory of God, thanks to the habit left from the prior intention. It is important, however, to see that what remains is a habit rather than some force (*virtus*), since otherwise this account would collapse into the account of virtually acting for an end.

So habitually acting for an end is distinct from actually acting for an end because there is no actual intention at the time of the action. It is distinct from virtually acting for an end because there is no remaining force from the prior intention. Rather, what remains is a habit. Furthermore, in this variant of acting with habitual intention the subsequent actions in which we are interested are ones consonant with the habitual intention[46].

Suárez thinks that this variant account of habitual intention also fails to do what is needed:

> For in this way of which we are talking now the end… [does not] virtually influence, because we also suppose that nothing remains in the human from the prior intention that now relates to the present action, but he holds himself in such a way in his way of acting and [would even] if the prior act had not preceded[47].

Here Suárez seems to be saying that with a habitual relation nothing remains of the prior intention that could refer the present action to the end[48]. But before he seemed to say just that, namely, that something did remain «through which that work either in particular or at least under a generality is related to such an end», just not the intention's *virtus*. This might look like a contradiction, but I think the better way to read the passage is to read the initial statement as a promise of what this variant account is supposed to provide. Suárez then argues that the promise cannot be fulfilled, since the habit either fails to relate the action to the end or, if it does so, it has to do so either via an act of will or

---

[46]   Suárez goes on to cite two passages from Aquinas in which he thinks that Aquinas may have this sort of acting in mind. Both citations are odd. As we saw earlier, in *ST* IaIIae.1.6 ad 3 Aquinas clearly says that the force from the first intention remains. But then it would be a case of virtual intention on Suárez's account, not habitual intention. The other citation is perhaps even more odd: *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus* (henceforth: *QDV*) q. 2, art. 11, ad 2. For in ad 2, Aquinas explicitly makes the distinction between actual and *virtual* action. *Habitual* action only comes up in the following solution, i.e., ad 3. It is odd both that Suárez would cite a place where Aquinas does explicitly distinguish between virtual and habitual action when he is complaining about Aquinas not making a satisfactory distinction—less surprising would have been if he had pointed out Aquinas's apparent inconsistency from one work to the next in using the terms—and that he then cites the passage in which Aquinas talks about virtually acting rather than the one about habitually acting.

[47]   *DFH* 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24-25): «*nam in hoc modo, de quo nunc agimus, finis nec actu influit, quia, ut supponimus, nec actu cogitatur, nec actu movet; nec etiam virtualiter influit, quia etiam supponimus ex priori intentione nihil esse in homine relictum, quod nunc conferat ad praesentem operationem, sed ita se habere hominem in modo operandi, ac si prior actus non praecessisset*».

[48]   This is a claim that he makes about habitual intention in a number of places.

via some remaining force and so would collapse into either actual or virtual intention[49].

Suárez ends the *DFH* discussion of habitual intention by expressing scepticism about whether habitual intention confers any value to actions[50]. This is of a piece with that he says about habitual intention in a variety of contexts. He does not think that it suffices for connecting an action to an end[51], for confecting a sacrament[52], or for ensuring that uttered words count as prayer[53]. In each of these contexts, he takes pains to argue that people are misguided who think that an appeal to habitual intention will do the needed work. Rather, if we need something weaker than actual intention, we need to look to virtual intention. As he puts it elsewhere:

> [A habitual relation] does not consist in any influence and true causality, but is merely extrinsic[54].

Virtual intention, however, does make a causal contribution. Note that the point is not that habitual intentions are causally impotent generally. Rather, the claim is that habitual intentions are only indirectly causative; the way a habitual intention would figure in an action's etiology would be to give rise to an actual or occurrent intention which would then be the direct cause of the external action. When Suárez talks of acting with a habitual intention, he should be understood as talking of acting with *merely* habitual intention, i.e., as talking of a situation in which the habitual intention did not give rise to an actual intention and *ipso facto* did not causally contribute to the external action.

Suárez does not—here at least—make the point, but it strikes me that there would be other contexts in which appeal to habitual intention would be relevant and useful. Consider the case of the just person who sins venially. If we were evaluating the person rather than the particular action, the habitual intention would be relevant. It is a good thing that the person is disposed to form just intentions, even if that disposition is not manifested in the current action. Of course, if the intention did manifest itself, it would no longer be a merely habitual intention but would have become actual. Still, the disposition is to be valued. But insofar as we are in contexts where we are evaluating actions to which a habitual intention did not contribute, Suárez is justified in being sceptical of appeals to it.

---

[49]   Note the difference between saying that something remains and saying that something remains that relates the action to an end. Something does remain in the case of habitual intention, i.e., a habit, but Suárez denies that it relates actions to the originally intended end.

[50]   *DFH* 2.4.3 (=OO 4:25).

[51]   *DFH* 2.4.2-3 (=OO 4:24-25).

[52]   *DS* 13.3.3 (=OO 20:250).

[53]   *De Religione*, t. IV, lib. 3, cap. 3, n. 6 (=OO 14:223-24).

[54]   *DFH* 3.5.4 (=OO 4:36): «… *probatur, quia talis intentio, vel influeret actu, vel virtute in actus posteriores; neutrum autem dici potest: ergo nullo modo, omitto enim relationem mere habitualem, quia, ut supra dixi, haec non consistit in aliquo influxu, et vera causalitate, sed est mere extrinseca*».

2.4.   Virtual intention

Suárez provides a clear account of the general conditions for virtual intention (although some of the concrete details will prove a trickier matter):

> About the third way of acting, namely, virtually, for the sake of the end, it should be noted that it is as if a middle between the preceding [two], because it neither requires actual influx for the sake of the end as the first does, nor entirely nothing as the second. But it requires some influx through some remaining force[55] from a prior intention. But it is difficult to say concerning this way what this force is and especially for this way I suppose that it is necessary that actual cognition and intention of such an end have gone before, because otherwise nothing would be whence that force would remain. Next, it is necessary that such an intention is not retracted through a contrary intention, because otherwise this contrary intention would destroy the force remaining from the prior intention. Thirdly, it is necessary that some effect remain from the prior intention, so that the work which is said afterwards to come to be virtually on account of such an end proceeds from it in some way[56].

Surprisingly, Suárez, who usually meticulously lists sources, fails to cite anyone for this account of virtual intention here, but elsewhere he cites Scotus and Biel and indicates sympathy with their account[57]. Scotus introduces virtual intention by noting that the division between actual and habitual intention leaves an opening for a third member that is in some sense intermediate between the other two and goes on to provide an account that is largely the same as Suárez's.

We can easily glean five individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions from the passage quoted above for there to be a virtual intention:

> An agent performs action *A* with a virtual intention for an end *E* iff (i) she actually intended *E* at some point prior to performing *A* and at the time of performing *A*: (ii) she no longer actually intends *E*, (iii) she has not retracted

---

[55]   The Latin «*virtus*» has the merit of being cognate with the name of this kind of intention. The English term «virtual intention» is the standard traditional term for this kind of intention and I have decided to keep it. «Virtue», however, would be a misleading translation for «*virtus*» in this context.

[56]   *DFH* 2.4.4 (=OO 4:25): «*Circa tertium modum operandi, scilicet virtualiter propter finem, notandum esse veluti medium inter praecedentes, quia nec requirit actualiter influxum propter finem ut primus, nec omnino nullum ut secundus; sed requirit aliquem influxum per aliquam virtutem relictam ex priori intentione; difficile vero est circa hunc modum dicere quid sit haec virtus, et imprimis sumo ad hunc modum necessarium esse ut praecesserit actualis cognitio, et intentio talis finis, quia alias nihil esset unde illa virtus fuisset relicta. Deinde oportet ut talis intentio non sit retractata per contrariam intentionem, quia alias haec contraria intentio destruxisset virtutem relictam per priorem intentionem. Tertio, necessarium est ut duret effectus aliquis relictus ex priori intentione, ut ab illo procedat aliquo modo opus, quod dicitur postea fieri virtualiter propter talem finem*».

[57]   *DS* 13.3.5-6 (=OO 20:251-52). See Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, dist. 6, q. 6, and Biel, *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. by Wilfridus Werbeck and Udo Hofmann (Tübingen: Mohr, J. C. B., 1984) liber IV, pars I, dist. 6, quaest. 1, art. 1, not. 3 (p. 226).

her previous actual intention, (iv) some force from her previous actual intention remains, and (v) this force gives rise to *A*.

The fifth condition was not explicit in the passage quoted above. It is worth noting, however, that the earlier point about intentions figuring in the etiology of an action is especially important in the case of virtual intention, since there might well be many candidate intentions present at any given moment in an agent that would satisfy the first four conditions. There is no problem, presumably, with saying that there are many virtual intentions present in the agent. But obviously we do not want to say that any action undertaken is done for the sake of each and every of the virtually intended ends; condition (v) prevents us from needing to say that.

The basic conditions for virtual intention are clear enough; the tricky part comes in saying just what the «force» is that is left behind by actual intention. Although one gets the impression that Suárez is not entirely satisfied with any of the proposals on offer[58], his preferred story is that the force remains in the executive power, i.e., the power that executes the commanded action[59]. For example, a priest may intend to celebrate the Mass—this is the same example that Scotus uses—but be distracted during the course of doing so such that he no longer has the actual intention. The executive power, however, retains the force of the earlier intention and continues to produce the relevant external actions until the sequence is completed. Even if the actions in the course of pursuing the end vary, the force of the intention is passed along as one action incites another.

In the *DFH* discussion, Suárez recognizes that cases where the executive power is wholly disengaged require a different story. To adapt a case that Aquinas raises[60], consider a doctor who wakes up in the morning and begins to make preparations to go collect herbs for making a medicine. Suppose, plausibly, that he remembers that he planned to make medicine today. But making medicine is not his ultimate end—he formed the plan to make medicine when he had an actual intention to cure patients. Today, however, as he collects herbs, he gives no thought to curing patients. He does not repeat the deliberation that led from the end of curing patients to the more proximate end of making medicine. Rather, as Suárez would say, making medicine «is immediately represented as needing to be carried out without any profound motion or special consideration of either it or the end to which it is ordered»[61]. Suárez does not think it plausible to attribute some enduring force in the executive power that remains through sleep and so forth in cases such as this. Rather, the will has to act to begin a new sequence of external actions. Suárez does not spell out how the force enduring

---

[58]   This impression is especially strong when reading his discussion in *DS* 13.3.5-6 (=OO 20:251-52).

[59]   *DFH* 2.4.4 (=OO 4:25) and *DS* 13.3.6 (=OO 20:252).

[60]   *QDV* q. 2, art. 11, ad 2.

[61]   *DFH* 2.4.4 (=OO 4:25): «… *statim repraesentatur ut exequendum absque alta motione, seu speciali consideratione illius, seu finis, ad quem ordinatur…*»

from the previous intention should be understood in these cases, but he is, nevertheless, confident that such cases really occur. Elsewhere, he suggests memory as a mechanism involved in virtual intention[62]; these cases seem apt for invoking memory as a means to restart the executive power.

Returning to a question raised earlier in the discussion of actual intention, we might wonder why we should posit these enduring forces in executive powers or memory. Why not just say that the actual intention endures in the will, although cognition of the end ceases? The suggestion is that even if cognition of the end is a prerequisite for forming an intention, the intention, once formed, can remain in the will while the attention of the intellect turns elsewhere. That Suárez does not recognize this possibility shows us something interesting about how he conceives of the relationship between intellect and will. Biel is helpfully explicit about this matter. He infers «an agent is not actually intending an end» from «an agent is not thinking about an end» and then defends the inference on grounds that intention is an act of will and so, like other acts of will, cannot be present without an act of intellect[63]. Intellect and will are more inextricably bound together than would be suggested by the mere claim that the will cannot act without a prior act of intellect; rather, the will cannot act without a concurrent act of intellect. Suárez is less explicit about this, but I take him to be in agreement with Biel. This is why the enduring forces must be posited in powers other than the will in cases where cognition of the intended ends is no longer present.

2.5.   Interpretative intention

We now get to the more mysterious fourth member. As I noted earlier, I have been unable to find any predecessor to Suárez who mentions interpretative intention. Furthermore, Suárez's account is opaque and, to make matters worse, he appears to offer no less than three accounts of it, all incompatible with each other. His accounts of the other three kinds of intention stay basically the same between *DFH*, *DBM*, and *DS*. But each work offers a different account of interpretative intention, accounts that are not even similar on the surface. I will focus on the accounts in *DFH* and *DBM*, but, for the sake of completeness, I will also briefly look at *DS*.

2.5.1. In De sacramentis in genere

In *DS*, Suárez is asking what sort of intention is sufficient for confecting a sacrament. The particular case he is concerned about when rejecting the sufficiency of interpretative intention is the case of a drunk priest who says the words of consecration over some bread. This is supposed to be an instance of

---

[62]   *DFH* 3.5.4 (=OO 4:37).
[63]   *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, liber IV, pars I, dist. 6, quaest. 1, art. 1, not. 3 (p. 226).

the familiar kind of case where one voluntarily puts oneself in a position where one's actions are no longer fully voluntary. We can call such actions indirectly voluntary and still impute moral responsibility on those grounds. So the priest no longer has his rational faculties about him, but, since he had them when he put himself into such a position, we can say that whatever he does while drunk is indirectly voluntary and that he is thereby morally responsible for those actions.

Suárez says that «there is thought to be» a kind of interpretative intention in cases of indirectly voluntary action[64]. He does not spell out just what these interpretative intentions are, but the basic suggestion is straightforward enough: an agent can be said to perform an action with an interpretative intention any time that she performs an action that is indirectly voluntary.

It is not clear to me, however, what is to be gained by attributing interpretative intentions in these cases of indirectly voluntary actions. For example, suppose someone is normally a loving, respectful husband who is appalled at the mere thought of hitting his wife and yet does precisely that when drunk. Assuming he is responsible for getting himself drunk, the claim is that he hits his wife with an interpretative intention. That he bears responsibility for hitting her is plausible enough, but why attribute an interpretative intention to him? Suppose while beating his spouse he is shouting at her about some perceived slight. Does he not then seem to have an actual intention to punish her for the perceived slight? Granted, he would not have formed that intention had he not been drunk and the intention is in conflict with his usual intentions. But similar things could be said about many of our actual intentions. Those facts do not seem to preclude it being an actual intention. It might be suggested that in some cases people have lost their rational faculties to such an extent that it no longer makes sense to attribute to them intentions or the ability to form intentions. But if that is so, why attribute any intentions to the person at all? To be sure, there are important connections between intentions and responsibility. In these kinds of cases, however, it would seem more natural to say that the person is responsible despite the lack of intentions rather than because of some interpretative intention. Why still responsible? Precisely because the actions are *indirectly*, albeit not directly, voluntary.

So, because the *DS* account of interpretative intention seems insufficiently motivated and because it seems quite different in kind from the other accounts, I will leave it to the side and focus on the remaining two accounts.

2.5.2 *In* De fine hominis

Each of the three ways of intending an end so far has posited a different psychological state. That is, actual, habitual, and virtual intentions were the kinds of intentions they were because of facts about the agent. As presented in

---

[64]   *DS* 13.3.2 (=OO 20:249).

DFH, the fourth way of intending seems to posit no new psychological state. Rather, the subject or agent has an intention of some end and that end is by its nature ordered to a further end:

> About the fourth way, which we call interpretatively acting for the sake of the end, it should be noted that sometimes the will intends some object in which the force of one's consideration and actual motion ceases. Yet that intended thing by its nature is carried along and ordered to another end. Therefore, in this case the will is said properly and explicitly, as it were, to intend the end proposed to it. But it is said to intend interpretatively the more ultimate end to which the end intended in the former way by its nature is brought[65].

It is a fact about the object, i.e., that it is ordered to a further end by its nature, rather than a fact about the subject that grounds an interpretative intention, though of course a fact about the subject—namely, that she has a proper intention—is a necessary condition for the interpretative intention. It is worth noting that interpretative intention seems to be contrasted with proper intention. It is not difficult to see why—when one learns about an interpretative intention, one is not really learning something new about the agent but rather is learning something new about that which the agent intended.

Suárez does not do so himself, but perhaps an analogy might be made with belief. Suppose we know that someone believes *p* and *q*. Then we learn that *p* and *q* entail *r*. We might then say that the believer is committed to *r*, but in some sense, of course, we have not learned anything new about the believer. Rather, we have learned something about the objects of her belief.

Suárez himself uses the example of just action:

> And in this way he who acts virtuously (*honeste*) for the sake of the goodness of mercy or justice, thinking nothing of God or of another end, is said to act for the sake of God or for the sake of happiness and to satisfy that [statement] of Paul in 1 Cor. 10[:31], «Do all things for the glory of God», because, that is to say, the *bonum honestum* itself that is intended is brought by its nature to God and is a means by which one is directed to happiness[66].

When someone acts for the sake of the moral goodness of justice, she interpretatively acts for the sake of God even if she neither *has* thought nor *is*

---

[65]   *DFH* 2.4.5 (=OO 4:25): «*Circa quartum modum, quem vocavimus interpretative operari propter finem, advertendum est, interdum voluntatem intendere aliquod objectum, in quo sistit ex vi considerationis, et hujus actualis motionis; tamen illa res intenta natura sua fertur, et ordinatur in alium finem; tunc ergo voluntas dicitur proprie, et quasi explicite intendere finem sibi propositum; interpretative vero dicitur intendere ulteriorem finem, ad quem finis priori modo intentus natura sua fertur*».

[66]   *DFH* 2.4.5 (=OO 4:25): «*… et ad hunc modum is, qui operatur honeste propter bonitatem misericordiae, aut iustitiae, nihil de Deo cogitans, aut de alio fine, dicitur operari propter Deum, vel propter beatitudinem, et implere illud Pauli 1 Corinth. 10. Omnia, in gloriam Dei facite, quia videlicet ipsum bonum honestum, quod intenditur, natura sua fertur in Deum, et est medium, quo tenditur ad beatitudinem*». Note the homeoteleutonic omission of «*natura sua fertur in Deum, et est medium, quo tenditur*» in the Vivès *Opera omnia*.

thinking about God. Aquinas thinks that fulfilling St. Paul's precept requires virtual intention. On the account of virtual intention we have been considering, that would require that at some point the agent have consciously ordered everything to God and that some force remain from that actual intention[67]. Suárez appears to think that actual intention unnecessary. It is sufficient to act for the sake of ends that are by their nature ordered to God.

Unfortunately, Suárez does not elaborate on how it is that an end by its own nature is ordered to a more ultimate end. What exactly is the relationship between the two ends such that there is reason to ascribe an interpretative intention of one on the basis of an actual or virtual intention of another? Suárez provides several more examples elsewhere of ends that are ostensibly ordered by their own nature to further ends. For example, he notes that some philosophers think that whenever one intends two particular ends for their own sake, one always also intends an integrated good that unites the two particular ends (recall the example I raised earlier of believing *p* and *q* and thereby being committed to what they entail). Suárez denies that one always properly intends such an integrated good. He grants, however, that we can always ascribe an interpretative intention for the integrated good[68]. This example might suggest that an ordering by nature to a further end is based on a close logical relation, e.g., that whenever one actually intends one end and actually intends another end, one interpretatively intends the conjunction of them[69].

But it is hard to see a similar sort of logical relation in some of his other examples of interpretative intention. For example, he also says that any action whatsoever, virtuous or not, is interpretatively done for the sake of the ultimate end taken formally[70]. What is it about the end pursued in a vicious action that of its nature is directed further to the ultimate end taken formally? Finally, we already saw that he thinks that actions done for the sake of moral goodness are done for the sake of God. This example might suggest a different model. On Suárez's view, any goodness exemplified by a created thing is contained in a more eminent way in God[71]. So perhaps Suárez's suggestion is that if an agent actually intends an end because it is *F*, then the agent may be said interpretatively to intend other things that are *F*, especially if those other things possess *F* in a better or more eminent way. Admittedly, I am not aware of a text

---

[67]   Aquinas's comment about the traveller walking to a destination might suggest that he has the same model of virtual intention, but perhaps that is hasty. Skrzypczak divides Aquinas's virtual intention into several kinds and identifies Suárez's interpretative intention with one of them: «Actual, Virtual, and Habitual Intention in St. Thomas Aquinas», 66-67.

[68]   *DFH* 3.2.5 (=OO 4:29).

[69]   Perhaps the integration of two goods is something more demanding than conjunction, in which case more than mere logical relations would have to hold between one end and that end to which it is ordered by nature.

[70]   *DFH* 3.6.2 (=OO 4:37).

[71]   *DFH* 5.2.4 (=OO 4:52).

where Suárez actually says this; still, it is a possibility worth bearing in mind[72].

One might be reminded here of Augustine's eloquent investigation of the real significance of our actions. In his *Confessions* he catalogues a variety of objects he has pursued from erotic adventures to the theft of pears, but what he really wanted throughout was happiness, a happiness only found in God:

> Those who think that the happy life is found elsewhere, pursue another joy and not the true one. Nevertheless their will remains drawn towards some image of the true joy[73].

This language of other objects being a kind of image of the true joy seems in keeping with Suárez's language of one object being directed to a further object. Insofar as what attracts an agent to the former object is precisely what makes it an image of the further object, one might attribute to the agent an interpretative intention directed to the further object. There appears to be a significant difference, however, between what Augustine is getting at and what Suárez is attempting to do with the notion of interpretative intention. On Suárez's view, a mortal sinner interpretatively intends a created good rather than God as her ultimate end[74]. I take Augustine's suggestion, however, to be that even such a sinner pursues the created good because it is in some sense an image of the true joy.

2.5.3 In De bonitate et malitia

In *DBM* we have yet another account of interpretative intention:

> There is thought to be [an interpretative intention] when a human being is in such a condition and so disposed that if such an end were to come into his thought, he would refer his act to it… [A] similar disposition does not suffice for blame, for, as is often read in Augustine, God will not judge us for the

---

[72] Cf. Richardson Lear's, G., account of teleological approximation in *Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), ch. 4.

[73] *Confessions* 10.22.32. A little earlier in the text Augustine says: «And what is the object of my love? I asked the earth and it said: "It is not I". I asked all that is in it; they made the same confession (Job 28: 12 f.). I asked the sea, the deeps, the living creatures that creep, and they responded: "We are not your God, look beyond us"… And I said to all these things in my external environment: "Tell me of my God who you are not, tell me something about him". And with a great voice they cried out: "He made us" (Ps. 99: 3). My question was the attention I gave to them, and their response was their beauty» (10.6.9). I am quoting the translation by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[74] *DFH* 3.3.12 (=OO 4:33): «since the sinner deserts his ultimate end on account of a good created thing and prefers that good to divine friendship; for this reason, he is thought interpretatively to love that created thing more than God as a friend and ultimate end» («*quia peccator propter bonum creatum deserit suum finem ultimum et bonum illud præfert divinæ amicitiæ, ideo interpretative censetur diligere illam creaturam plus quam Deum, ut amicum et ultimum finem*»).

things we would have done had these or those occasions come up or if such and such thoughts had been allowed to be stirred up in us[75].

Recall that the previous characterization made a claim about the *object* of the agent's actual intention, namely, that the object was such that it by its nature is ordered to a further end. The characterization here, however, does not say anything about the object of an agent's intention. Rather, it offers a counterfactual claim about the agent: namely, that the agent is such that were she to consider the end, she would order her action to it.

It's not too difficult to see how this might get applied in the case of the precept from St. Paul that Aquinas and Suárez worry about, i.e., that one should do everything for the glory of God. We might imagine that someone who has dedicated her life to God but then does something without having considered that particular thing in relation to God would be happy enough to order it to God were the thought to come into her mind. This sort of intention might also be thought a promising avenue to explore when thinking about the claim that we do everything for the sake of happiness. Most people do things often enough without actually thinking about happiness, but the counterfactual «they would have done what they did for the sake of happiness, if they had thought about happiness» is no doubt often true in such cases.

One might worry, however, that interpretative intention understood in this way threatens to collapse into one of the other kinds of intention. If the intention is, for example, causally efficacious, i.e., standing at the source of some or all of the agent's actions, then is it not a case of actual intention? Is it not genuine act of the will? On the other hand, if not, then what separates it from habitual intention? It is worth noting here how often we employ counterfactuals when talking about dispositions (e.g., «that vase is fragile—it would have broken had it fallen»). The person who has dedicated her life to God is aptly described as being disposed to or having a habit of ordering things to God[76]. Even if a way is found to keep interpretative intentions characterized counterfactually distinct from habitual intentions, they seem vulnerable to the same kind of objection that Suárez raises against habitual intentions discussed earlier. That is, a counterfactually described interpretative intention «does not consist in any influence and true causality»[77].

---

[75]   *DBM* 6.5.1 (=OO 4:368): «*Prima ergo affirmat sufficere intentionem interpretativam, quae tunc esse censetur, quando homo est ita affectus et dispositus, quod si talis finis in suam cogitationem veniret, actum suum in ullum referret. Sed hunc dicendi modum apud nullum scriptum invenio, neque habet fundamentum, aut probabilitatem, quia illa conditionalis nihil ponit in esse, imo nec cognosci potest, nisi a solo Deo. Item quia similis dispositio non sufficit ad culpam, non enim, ut saepe apud Augustinum legitur, iudicabit nos Deus per ea quae faceremus, si hae, vel illae occasiones occurrerent, aut si tales cogitationes in nobis excitari permitteret…*»

[76]   Cf. the following sentence from a recent legal article: «[Actual or virtual intention] is not the same as an "interpretative" intention, which exists only as a disposition or habit of mind, and becomes actual if one thinks about [the end]…» (Sanson, R. J., «Implied Simulation: Grounds for Annulment?», *The Jurist* 48 [1988]: 751-52).

[77]   *DFH* 3.5.4 (=OO 4:36).

2.5.4. *Relating the last two characterizations*

Leaving aside the characterization from *DS*, we have two characterizations of interpretative intention on the table:

1. An agent performs action *A* with an interpretative intention[DFH] for an end E_1 iff at the time of performing *A*: (i) she properly intends (i.e., actually or virtually intends) E_2, (ii) *A* was performed for the sake of E_2 thanks to that proper intention, (iii) she does not properly intend E_1, but (iv) E_2 is ordered by its nature to E_1.

2. An agent performs action *A* with an interpretative intention[DBM] for an end E_1 iff at the time of performing *A*: (i) she does not properly intend E_1 but (ii) would properly intend E_1 if she were to think about E_1.

These characterizations certainly do not sound the same, but might they just be different descriptions of the same thing? It is hard to see how. For example, suppose Suárez is right that just actions are such that they are naturally ordered to God, so that according to the first characterization a person performing just actions thereby interpretatively intends God. But presumably there are atheists who perform just actions but who would quite emphatically *not* order those actions to God were they to think of God. It seems, then, that they would have the interpretative intention according to the first characterization but not according to the second. The alignment also fails in the other direction. There could be cases where an agent would order an action to a given end (and so interpretatively intends[DBM] that end) but where there is nothing about the end that she actually intends that is ordered by its nature to that given end (and so does not interpretatively intend[DFH] that end). For example, a devout but flawed Christian—that should not be too difficult to imagine—might be disposed to order everything to God but periodically fall into acting for some reprehensible end. Suárez claims that virtue is naturally ordered to God; he does not claim that vice is.

The basic problem is that one characterization talks about the objects intended by an agent and the other characterization talks about the agent's psychological states, and it is difficult to see why these two rather different kinds of things should align neatly.

One strategy to bring these into alignment would be to idealize the agent sufficiently. If one end by its nature is ordered to a further end, then perhaps an ideal agent would recognize that fact and so would come also to intend the ultimate end. For example, the ideal agent would recognize the connection between just action and God and so would intend God were she to think of God. In this way, idealizing the agents might handle the atheist counterexample, at least if Suárez is right to think that there are convincing rational considerations for believing in God[78].

---

[78]   See *DM* 29.

Whether idealizing the agent really does the needed work turns out to be a delicate matter[79]. Let's focus on the atheist case. The atheist who discovers that her just actions are naturally ordered to God has more than one option that will maintain rational consistency in the face of her discovery. One is to keep performing just actions and recognize that they are for the glory of God, but the second is to cease performing just actions now that she knows they are naturally ordered to something not her ultimate end. Even if rational considerations were to compel a rational agent to believe in God, she would still be free to reject God. As James 2:19 reports, «even the demons believe—and shudder» (NRSV). If this analysis is right, then there can still be cases where the *DFH* account would posit an interpretative intention but the *DBM* would not[80].

It is worth noting, too, that there is nothing explicit in Suárez's text to encourage this kind of ideal-agent reading. Hence, I am inclined to conclude that it is not the right approach to reconciling the two characterizations, although I also do not know of any more promising approach.

At this point, we should pause and ask why there are these different characterizations. Perhaps Suárez thinks that a fourth kind of intention is needed but he has not yet fixed on a fully satisfying account of it. As a result he tries one approach in one work, but, not really satisfied with it, ends up trying another one in the next work. Maybe he heard objections to his *DFH* account when he gave his lectures in Rome and so tried a new approach when he gave the *DBM* lectures. This is, of course, all highly speculative, but it would be in keeping with the suggestion that interpretative intention is a new development in the tradition. An alternative explanation for the different accounts might be that he is actually not making just one fourfold distinction but rather is making three of them, each tailored to its specific context. The fact that the first three members remain the same in all three contexts suggests against this latter explanation, but perhaps not decisively. But on either explanation, it would be a mistake to expect to find a way to align the different characterizations. On the former explanation, however, one might still want to try to identify the common motivation behind the different characterizations. On either characterization, interpretative intentions offer a potential way to understand St. Paul's injunction that one should do everything for the glory of God.

3.   LEGACY

I have presented Suárez's fourfold distinction of intentions in some detail. Actual intention is the paradigmatic case. In contemporary terms, we might

---

[79]   My thanks to Schmid, S. and Williams, S. for pushing me to see that I needed to say more here.

[80]   If one demanded a more extreme idealization so that it is impossible for such an agent to fail to intend God as her ultimate end, then note that the idealization would be doing all the work. There would be no point to bring in the proper intentions mentioned in the *DFH* characterization of interpretative intention.

call it an «occurrent intention». A habitual intention for a given end is the disposition to form actual intentions for that end, but without there currently being an actual intention for that end or any enduring force from a previous actual intention. Virtual intention shares with habitual intention the fact that there is currently no actual intention, but diverges from it in that there is some force (*virtus*) remaining from a previous actual intention that continues to result in external actions. So far, matters are relatively clear. The fourth member, interpretative intention, poses more of a challenge, both because it is more difficult to see what the logical space is that it is supposed to fill and because Suárez seems to provide three quite dissimilar accounts of it.

I want to end by noting a few points about the post-Suárez reception of this fourfold distinction. As noted earlier, in Scotus and Biel we find a threefold distinction. It is difficult to say whether the credit is all due to Suárez, but after Suárez it is certainly standard to distinguish between four kinds of intention rather than just three. Dozens of ethics textbooks, lexicons, and the like from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries list the four kinds of intention and provide brief characterizations of them. The textbook by Coppens quoted at the beginning of the paper is only one example. The different kinds of intention also figured in a heated nineteenth-century dispute English dispute over «the Romish doctrine of intention», which is what led to the mention in MacKenzie's novel *The Altar Steps* quoted at the head of this paper[81]. Noteworthy for present purposes is that many of these works direct readers to Suárez as a source of the doctrine; some are more or less verbatim excerpts from Suárez. Those that do not cite Suárez directly often cite Alfonso Maria de' Liguori, who in turn does cite Suárez[82].

A striking feature of these later works is that most of them follow Suárez's counterfactual characterization of interpretative intention, i.e., the one from *DBM*, and make no mention of the other characterizations. One might

---

[81]   See, for example: Lloyd Langford-James, R., *The Doctrine of Intention* (London: Society for Promoting Knowledge, Ch., 1924) and Minton, S., *The Romish Doctrine of Intention: In an Unanswered Letter to the Roman Catholic Priests of Liverpool…* (London: Seeley's, 1851).

[82]   Here are some examples, but this is by no means an exhaustive list (searching through a service such as Google Books should quickly find many more): Billuart, R. Ch., *Summa Summæ S. Thomæ, sive, Compendium theologiæ*, tom. 5 (Leodii: apud Kints, E., 1754), 212-16; Delany, J. F., «Intention», *The Catholic Encyclopedia,* vol. 8 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910), 69-70; Elliott, Ch., *Delineation of Roman Catholicism, Drawn from the Authentic and Acknowledged Standards of the Church of Rome…*, vol. 1 (New York: Lane, G., and Sanford, P. P., 1842), 187; Ferraris, L., *Prompta bibliotheca canonica, juridica, moralis, theologica…*, vol. 4 (Paris: Migne, J. P., 1861), 725-46; Gury, J.-P., *Compendium theologiae moralis*, tom. 2 (Barcinone: apud Subirana, J., 1861), 74; Lee, G. F., *The Validity of the Holy Orders of the Church of England Maintained and Vindicated: Both Theologically and Historically, with Foot-notes, Tables of Consecrations, and Appendices* (London: Hayes, J. T., 1869), 234-35; de' Liguori, A. M., *Theologia moralis* (Romae: sumptibus Remondinianis, 1757), 85; O'Keefe, J., *Notes on the Rubrics of the Roman Ritual: Regarding the Sacraments in General, Baptism, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction* (New York: O'Shea, P., 1883), 46-47; and Probst, F., *Verwaltung der hochheiligen Eucharistie* (Tübingen: Laupp, H., 1853), 108-9.

have thought that if you had to pick you would pick one of Suárez's other characterization as his official position. The *DS* account might have some claim in that *DS* is the only one of the three works that was published during Suárez's lifetime. But the *DFH* characterization might be thought to have the strongest claim, on grounds that it comes in the lengthier, *ex professo* discussion. Nevertheless, only the *DBM* characterization gains currency. I have found two exceptions to the general rule of adopting the counterfactual account. Joannes Polman, in his *Breviarium theologicum*, defines it this way:

> Interpretative intention is that by which someone intending something is thought implicitly to intend something else contained, attached, or subsequent to it[83].

As in the *DFH* characterization, here the issue concerns the object of an agent's intention, i.e., whether something is contained, attached, or subsequent to it[84]. By and large, however, it is the counterfactual account that gets picked up in the subsequent tradition. A lingering question for which I do not have the answer is why this is the account that became canonical.

I will close with some historiographical remarks sparked by finding these later references to the four kinds of intention. A common question about historical philosophers concerns their influence. In the case of Suárez, this often takes the form of asking about his influence on modern thought. What that question means depends, of course, on whether the term «modern» simply designates a chronological period or whether it designates a particular philosophical approach that may be more or less characteristic of the eponymous period of time. Be that as it may, typically when the question of Suárez's influence is brought up, scholars look for traces of his thought in the canonical or extrascholastic modern philosophers, e.g., Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Kant[85]. There is scholarly disagreement, of course, over how much Suárezian influence is to be found here, though undoubtedly some. Not much, if any, however, is to be found if we focus on Suárez's distinction between the four kinds of intention.

There is nothing wrong with investigating the influence of Suárez's thought on the extrascholastic moderns. If that is the only question of influence we ask, however, then we will miss most of Suárez's influence. One should keep firmly in mind that the scholastic traditions survived—and flourished—long

---

[83]   *Breviarium theologicum* (Antverpiae: apud Verdussen Juniorem, H., 1686), 546: «*Intentio interpretativa est ea, qua quis intendens aliquid, censetur impliciter intendere aliud: in eo contentum, annexum, aut subsequuum*».

[84]   Baptiste Gonet, J., also follows the *DFH* account in *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae*, tom. 3 (Antuerpiae: apud Pitteri, F., 1754), 15.

[85]   This happens so frequently that an example is scarcely needed, but for one example, see Salas, V. M. and Fastiggi, R. L. «Introduction: Francisco Suárez, the Man and His Work», *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*, ed. V. M. Salas and R. L. Fastiggi (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 24-28.

after Descartes and his allies launched their attacks on scholastic philosophy.[86]. Properly assessing Suárez's influence, therefore, requires examining the scholastics who came after him as well. As soon as we look at scholastic works and the more popular works based on them, one promptly finds more references to Suárez and his doctrines than one could examine in a lifetime[87].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANSCOMBE, G. E. M., *Intention*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.

AUGUSTINE., *Confessions*, translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

AUSTIN, J. L., *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

BARNWELL, M., *The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue.* Leiden: Brill, 2010.

—. «Voluntary Inconsideration, Virtual Cognition, and Francisco Suárez». *Southwest Philosophical Studies* 31 (2009): 9-14.

BIEL, G., *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, edited by Wilfridus Werbeck and Hofmann. Tübingen: MOHR, J. C. B., 1984.

BILLUART, Ch. R., *Summa Summæ S. Thomæ, sive, Compendium theologiæ*, tom. 5. Leodii: apud KINTS, E.,1754.

BRACHTENDORF, J., «Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez: eine spätscholastische Kritik an Thomas von Aquins Lehre vom Letztziel des Menschen». *Theologie und Philosophie* 76 (2001): 530-50.

COPPENS, Ch., *A Brief Text-book of Moral Philosophy.* New York: Schwartz, Kirwin, and Fauss, 1895.

DELANY, J. F., «Intention». *The Catholic Encyclopedia,* vol. 8. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910.

Durand of Saint-Pourçain. *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII.* Venetiis: ex typographia Guerrae, 1571.

ELLIOTT, Ch., *Delineation of Roman Catholicism, Drawn from the Authentic and Acknowledged Standards of the Church of Rome…*, vol. 1. New York: LANE, G. and SANFORD, P. P., 1842.

ESCHMANN, I., Theodore. *The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two Courses*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1997.

---

[86]   Two helpful papers are NOVOTNÝ, D. D., «In Defense of Baroque Scholasticism»," *Studia Neoaristotelica* 6 (2009): 209-33, and SCHMUTZ, J., «Medieval Philosophy after the Middle Ages», in *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 245-66.

[87]   My thanks to Heine Hansen, Terence Irwin, Scott MacDonald, Chris Meyns, Erin Penner, Stephan Schmid, and Scott Williams for valuable comments on one or more of a series of talks and papers that finally led to the present one. I suspect I have forgotten some people who have helped me understand this material; I interpretatively intend to thank them as well.

FERRARIS, L., *Prompta bibliotheca canonica, juridica, moralis, theologica…*, vol. 4. Paris: J. P. Migne, 1861.

GONET, J. B., *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae,* tom. 3. Antuerpiae: apud PITTERI, F., 1754.

GURY, J.-P., *Compendium theologiae moralis*, tom. 2. Barcinone: apud Subirana, J., 1861.

IRWIN, T., *The Development of Ethics*, vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

JOHN DUNS S., *Ordinatio* in *Iohannis Duns Scoti Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani opera omnia*, edited by C. Balić et alii. Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanae 1950.

LANGFORD-JAMES, R. Ll., *The Doctrine of Intention*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1924.

LEAR, G. R., *Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

LEE, F. G., *The Validity of the Holy Orders of the Church of England Maintained and Vindicated: Both Theologically and Historically, with Foot-notes, Tables of Consecrations, and Appendices*. London: J. T. Hayes, 1869.

LIGUORI, A. M. DE'., *Theologia moralis*. Romae: sumptibus Remondinianis, 1757.

MACDONALD, S., «Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning: Aquinas's Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe's Fallacy». *The Philosophical Review* 100 (1991): 31-66.

MACKENZIE, Sir C., *The Altar Steps*. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922.

MCCLUSKEY, C., «Happiness and Freedom in Aquinas's Theory of Action». *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 9 (2000): 69-90.

MINTON, S., *The Romish Doctrine of Intention: In an Unanswered Letter to the Roman Catholic Priests of Liverpool…* London: Seeley's, 1851.

NOVOTNÝ, D. D., «In Defense of Baroque Scholasticism». *Studia Neoaristotelica* 6 (2009): 209-33.

O'KEEFE, J., *Notes on the Rubrics of the Roman Ritual: Regarding the Sacraments in General, Baptism, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction*. New York: P. O'Shea, 1883.

PENNER, S., «Final Causality: Suárez on the Priority of Final Causation». In *Suárez on Aristotelian Causality,* edited by Jakob Leth Fink, 121-48. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

—. «Francisco Suárez on Acting for the Sake of the Ultimate End». PhD diss., Cornell University, 2011.

PERLER, D., «Suárez on Consciousness». *Vivarium* 52 (2014): 261-86.

POLMAN, J., *Breviarium theologicum*. Antverpiae: apud Hieronymum Verdussen Juniorem, 1686.

PROBST, F., *Verwaltung der hochheiligen Eucharistie*. Tübingen: H. Laupp, 1853.

SALAS, V. M. and FASTIGGI, R. L., «Introduction: Francisco Suárez, the Man and His Work». In *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*, edited by Victor M. Salas and Robert L. Fastiggi, 1-28. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

SANSON, R. J., «Implied Simulation: Grounds for Annulment?» *The Jurist* 48 (1988): 747-70.

SCHMID, S., «Finality without Final Causes? Suárez's Account of Natural Teleology». *Ergo* 2 (2015). DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.016

SCHMUTZ, J., «Medieval Philosophy after the Middle Ages». In *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, edited by John Marenbon, 245-66. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

SIMONIN, H., «La Notion d'Intentio dans l'Oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin». *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 19 (1930): 445-63.

SKRZYPCZAK, E. R., «Actual, Virtual, and Habitual Intention in St. Thomas Aquinas»." Master's thesis, Loyola University Chicago, 1958.

SUÁREZ, F., *Opera omnia*. Paris: Vivès, 1856-78.

—. *Tractatus quinque theologici ad Primam Secundae D. Thomae*. Lugduni: sumptibus Iacobi Cardon, 1628.

Thomas Aquinas. *Corpus Thomisticum. S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*. Edited by Enrique Alarcón. Pamplona, 2000. Online at http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/iopera.html.

Asbury University, Wilmore, KY (USA)   Sydney Penner
sfp@sydneypenner.ca

[Artículo aprobado para publicación en enero de 2018]