Pain-sensation and its difference with feelings open to disvalues

Abstract

Against the confusion that we find in the literature, we must distinguish between «sensation» and «feeling», in order to decide in which field the pain is included. The article defends Stumpf and Husserl`s thesis that pain (physical pain) is basically sensation. But, in agreement with Scheler, the article also defends that there are sensible feelings in addition to «pain-sensation». These could be named «displeasure» (unintentional) and «dislike» (intentional). Among the feelings of dislike there are some with transcendent intentionality, which are those linked to «exhibitive sensations» (sight, hearing…). But there is also a feeling of «dislike» linked to pain-sensation, which has an «immanent intentionality» (and whose affective base is «displeasure»). Dislike and displeasure linked to painsensation can be referred to as «pain-feeling», but must be clearly distinguished from «pain-sensation».