The dual process model of moral judgement

A divided mind or a myopic methodology?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v77.i295.y2021.006

Keywords:

dual process model, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene, dilemmas

Abstract

In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautological, while on the other, I show that the use of dilemmas is not an adequate tool with which to account for moral deliberation.

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Published

2021-11-30

How to Cite

Pérez Zafrilla, P. J. . (2021). The dual process model of moral judgement: A divided mind or a myopic methodology?. Pensamiento. Revista De Investigación E Información Filosófica, 77(295 Extra), 511–521. https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v77.i295.y2021.006

Issue

Vol. 77 No. 295 Extra (2021): Practical Challenges of Neurophilosophy

Section

Artículos

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