The realist claim of fallibilism: A critique of the realism of Karl Popper

Authors

  • Rafael Fayos Febrer Universidad San Pablo CEU, Madrid

Keywords:

Popper, Tarski, metaphysical realism, scientific realism.

Abstract

This article revises Karl Popper’s realism and examines how far he was a realist or simply he tried to be. Distinguishing between two areas of realism, a general one against the idealism, and the other more specific as part of the philosophy of the science, we analyze Popper’s realism coming to the conclusion that we are facing a fake, and at the same time, precarious realism. Popper was, in any case, a Kantian realist.

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How to Cite

Fayos Febrer, R. (2015). The realist claim of fallibilism: A critique of the realism of Karl Popper. Pensamiento. Revista De Investigación E Información Filosófica, 69(261 S.Esp), 855–868. Retrieved from https://revistas.comillas.edu/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/4717

Issue

Vol. 69 No. 261 S.Esp (2013): SERIE ESPECIAL N.º 6

Section

Estudios, textos, notas y comentarios

License

The publishing Universidad Pontificia Comillas retain the copyright of articles published in Pensamiento. Reuse of content is allowed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivates 3.0 Unported. Authors are encouraged to publish their work on the Internet (for example, on institutional or personal pages, repositories, etc.) respecting the conditions of this license and quoting appropriately the original source.

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