

---

# DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, THE *EPOCHÈ* OF SOLITARY MEDITATION

*Dag Hammarskjöld, la epochè de la meditaci3n solitaria*

Virgilio Cesarone

D'Annunzio University

v.cesarone@unich.it; <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7574-5486>

---

Received: October 1, 2024

Accepted: October 22, 2024

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.14422/ryf.vol288.i1465.y2024.004>

**ABSTRACT:** Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary General who died in 1961, tried to work towards a conciliation for peace by virtue of personal isolation through a suspension of specific political militancy. The intention of this contribution is to allow the "political" virtue of the *epochè* to emerge, as it can be understood from his written legacy, and consequently his political action. The parallelism between the phenomenological attitude and that proper to Hammarskjöld's meditations must be stripped of all the gnoseological peculiarities belonging to the modern subject. If, in fact, the *epochè* of Husserlian is a return of all the primordial contents of consciousness to an identical subject of knowledge, in Hammarskjöld, the 'subject' is the one who seeks the originality of giving oneself to consciousness in listening to one's own freedom, which is not the arbitrariness of the ability to "do", but the attention, with respect to what the world offers us.

**KEYWORDS:** political theology, *epochè*, inner stillness, meditation, responsibility, religion.

**RESUMEN:** Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretario General de la ONU fallecido en 1961, intentó trabajar hacia una conciliación por la paz en virtud del aislamiento personal a través de una suspensión de la militancia política específica. La intención de esta contribución es permitir que emerja la virtud "política" de la *epoché*, tal como se puede entender a partir de su legado escrito, y consecuentemente su acción política. El paralelismo entre la actitud fenomenológica y la propia de las meditaciones de Hammarskjöld debe despojarse de todas las peculiaridades gnoseológicas pertenecientes al sujeto moderno. Si, de hecho, la *epoché* husserliana es un retorno de todos los contenidos primordiales de la conciencia a un sujeto idéntico de conocimiento, en Hammarskjöld, el 'sujeto' es aquel que busca la originalidad de entregarse a la conciencia en la escucha de la propia libertad, que no es la arbitrariedad de la capacidad de "hacer", sino la atención, con respecto a lo que el mundo nos ofrece.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** teología política, *epoché*, quietud interior, meditaci3n, responsabilidad, religi3n.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The figure of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who died tragically in 1961 after what was considered an assassination attempt while working for peace on the African continent, still awaits due prominence in the field of philosophical-religious studies. The writings to which attention should be paid, apart from the speeches given in the course of his public duties, are collected in a Diary, written from 1925 to 1961, and entrusted to his friend Leif Belfrage for possible future publication; a “white book”, in his own words, as a testimony of “negotiations” with himself and with God (Hammarskjöld, 1983, p. V).<sup>1</sup>

In reading these intense pages of notes, verses and aphorisms, one has the impression of being confronted with a veritable ‘political theology’. Such a definition does not seem inappropriate, if not provocative, in this context. At first glance, the syntagm ‘political theology’ expresses an intertwining of theology and politics that can take on two distinct meanings. In the sphere of political and legal theories, it can be understood as a doctrine aimed at legitimising a particular political order on the basis of a sacral or theological reference, or as a research methodology aimed at identifying the links between these two spheres (Carl Schmitt).

In the field of theological disciplines, political theology can instead be understood as what revelation has to say about the political (Jacques Maritain), or the political dimension inherent in the Gospel proclamation itself (Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann). Certainly the declination that had the most success in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the one formulated by Carl Schmitt in his 1921 work, in which, with respect to any form of rational architecture of the construction of state sovereignty, he vigorously asserts *ex abrupto* in the first line of his treatise: “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception” (Schmitt, 1998, p. 33), decreeing the abyss of the personal will as the crucial moment for the institution of any form of state power.

If, however, we must immediately distance ourselves from the Schmittian model, in order to understand what we mean by political theology when we speak of Hammarskjöld (unless we use it as a contrastive heuristic concept), we must make clear a common element that all the various interpretations (Esposito, 2013; Borghesi, 2013; Cacciari, 2013; De Vitiis, 2014)

---

<sup>1</sup> Gustaf Aulén points out that the terms “white book” and “negotiations” are borrowed from Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic activity and refer to his spiritual life (cfr. Aulén, 1969, p. VII).

of political theology bring with them, consisting in the implicit affirmation of the unavoidability of political theology itself. It, in fact, belongs to our being in history, re-proposing a metaphysical question, which is that of the relationship between eternity and history, between the one and the many. In this sense, political theology cannot be considered exclusively a question concerning a second philosophy, a political philosophy or a philosophy of law, but is fully part of the so-called first philosophy. Political theology, therefore, operates hermeneutically insofar as it is established on the basis of the self-representation that historical man has of himself in the confrontation with tradition in view of the future.

Assuming this determination, it will no longer be difficult to accept the definition of political theology in order to understand the intertwining of spiritual life and political commitment that materialised in the public conduct of Dag Hammarskjöld. The meditations contained in his diary, in fact, restore the ground, the humus one might say, used first by the Vice-Minister of the Royal House of Sweden and then by the Secretary General of the UN to clarify the relationship of his own person to what history presented him with as a continuous occasion of testing, of *tentatio* (Heidegger, 1995) we might say.<sup>2</sup> So our proposal is to first of all explicate the way in which Hammarskjöld manages to reach that fertile ground within himself, a harbinger of an opening towards new horizons of understanding; secondly, we will try to outline what results they achieve.

## 2. FOR AN "EXTROVERT" *EPOCHÈ*

The 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology an attempt to clarify the possibilities inherent to the consciousness of the transcendental subject to break out of the natural attitudes that distract us from grasping the truth of the reality that surrounds us. One of the fundamental tools, perhaps the instrument, was, starting with the *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, the *epochè*, which was to be followed by a transcendental reduction. *Epochè* would, according to Husserl, be the "royal road" to arrive at the "science of origins". Far from wishing to

---

<sup>2</sup> By the term *tentatio* we do not mean temptation in the sense of a propensity to allow oneself to be ensnared by *voluptas*, but in the sense Heidegger gives it in his lectures on Augustine, i.e. the opportunity to understand the actual life of one's ego in an adequate manner (Heidegger, 1995, p. 205 ff.).

take up the attitudes of the Sceptics with this methodical practice, Husserl intended instead to put natural attitudes, i.e. all those pre-understandings of reality provided to us by common feeling, in brackets, so that they would lose their force, be silenced. Only after their "extinguishing" (*Ausschaltung*) would it be possible to return to things themselves, the fundamental programmatic motto of phenomenology, making philosophy a "rigorous" science. While avoiding going into a detailed examination of these concepts, it is worth recalling that this methodological practice responded to the need proper to the philosophy of modernity, *post Deum mortum*, to secure the possibility of knowledge by leading all the contents of consciousness back to a transcendental subject always identical to itself. Husserl, for his part, through the completion of *epochè* in a transcendental reduction, aimed to lead thought to the "original and ultimately perfect evidence" (Husserl, 1988, p. 122) of what it knows, since the "original character of reason" (Husserl, 1988, p. 122) belongs exclusively to it. It is this method that allows us to arrive at the *Wesensschauung*, the vision of essence, understood as "originally offering intuition" and the "ultimate legitimate source of all reasonable assertions". So, if the goal of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy is to discover the fundamental structures of consciousness in general, the only means by which we can reach it is the movement of ascertainment guaranteed by *epochè* and transcendental reduction. Now, in our humble opinion, the decisive philosophical question in reference to *epochè* is the predetermination of what can be found at the moment this methodical way takes place, or at least the horizon from which such a finding is possible. In other words, the question is whether *epochè* represents a sort of fiction, i.e. a form of self-deception of a thought that is directed towards goals already recognised in advance as worthy of being reached, or whether it frees the same towards new goals, glimpsed through movements never hinted at by the thought itself; or, at least, whether *epochè*, while not guaranteeing the attainment of a goal, marks the "how" of its attainment. Taken in such terms, then, the topic of *epochè* is not only of methodological importance, but becomes essential to the very status of rigorous thinking within the phenomenological perspective. In our view, the fundamental question, which lies at the heart of *epochè*, is the presumption that something exists and is given beyond the obvious positions of meaning. This is why the question of *epochè* cannot but present itself in close and essential correlation with the question of truth. After all, truth is something we do not know, but of which we have an idea, we seek it knowing that it is given, and in order to move towards it we must do without what we apparently believe to be true. This dimension of phenomenological 'faith' should be emphasised, whereby we place our trust in the possibility of an original encounter with

the being, retracting every assumption provided by tradition, but grasping only the giving of the being that shows itself in a direct manner.

If we reflect, however, on the meanings of the Greek verb *epecho*, we note that alongside "to withdraw", "to abstain", there are other meanings which should be taken into account, such as "to keep one self to oneself", "to be patient", "to wait". This means that alongside the conception of *epochè* as a methodological instrument at the service of the certainty of the being's becoming, the subject of modernity remains the one which is deputed to take control of this gnoseological legality, in order to try to constitute an original science in the encounter with it. Therefore, we can conceive of *epochè* as a moment of suspension of the self itself, which withdraws from all the certainties of its own noetic capacity, to let silence reign in its own interior life. Precisely for this reason it is necessary to be able to purify the eye. This is the meaning of Hammarskjöld's *epochè* taken from the meditation traditionally attributed to Thomas of Kempis (1996):

The purer the eye of intention, the more strength the soul finds in itself... But it is very rare to find a soul completely free, whose purity is not sullied by some taint of secret self-seeking ...Work, then, to purify the eye of your intention, that it may be simple effect (p. 133).

These words echo in the following passage from Hammarskjöld's diary: "In order for the eye to perceive color, it must divest itself of all colors" (Hammarskjöld, 1983, p. 108). This is why it seems appropriate to us to add the adjective "extrovert" to the *epochè*, given that the direction towards which we want to open up to the possibility of a real science of things is not that of a certainty of the individual in his absolute consciousness, freed from all ties with the world, but that it is the void destined to be filled with what the light of faith will grant.

### 3. INNER STILLNESS

Among Hammarskjöld's first acts when he took office in 1953 was to design and personally supervise the construction of a meditation room on the ground floor of the United Nations building. Hammarskjöld himself wrote the text from which we quote excerpts, published in the leaflet that illustrated the reasons for setting up what was to be, and was, A Room of Stillness:

We all have within us a center of stillness surrounded by silence. This house, dedicated to work and debate in the service of peace, should have one room dedicated to silence in the outward sense and stillness in the inner sense.

It has been the aim to create in this small room a place where the doors may be open to the infinite lands of thought and prayer.

People of many faiths will meet here, and for that reason none of the symbols to which we are accustomed in our meditation could be used (Hammarskjöld, 1957).

The quiet room was to be a meeting point for people of different faiths, and for this, all the symbols that traditionally accompany meditative practice had to be dispensed with. And yet, Hammarskjöld explains, the lack of traditional symbols favours the emergence of two elements that connect the visitor to the "simple", which speak in the same language to the different traditions. This is why the quiet room received a ray of sunlight falling on a block of rock. In Hammarskjöld's intentions, the sunlight illuminating the rock is the light of the spirit giving life to matter. But the rock did not simply represent something to be illuminated. In fact, it symbolises what is firm and stable in a world in which everything moves and changes abruptly, being anchored in something concrete and keeping our feet firmly on the ground. Moreover, the block of rock is composed of ferrous material, a metal used for weapons and therefore for destruction, but also used to build houses for men, places that welcome and refresh.

The shaft of light strikes the stone in a room of utter simplicity. There are no other symbols, there is nothing to distract our attention or to break in on the stillness within ourselves. When our eyes travel from these symbols to the front wall, they meet a simple pattern opening up the room to the harmony, freedom and balance of space.

There is an ancient saying that the sense of a vessel is not in its shell but in the void. So it is with this room. It is for those who come here to fill the void with what they find in their center of stillness. (Hammarskjöld, 1957).

We wanted to start with these words, written by Hammarskjöld for a public occasion, taking them as a red thread that can help us understand his private, intimate writing, his *Vägmärken*, the markings.

Let us begin, then, with the need to be able to foster silence and stillness. This attitude takes up to the letter what is prescribed by the phenomenological *epochè*: it is necessary to take leave of all those presumptions that are the fruit of our natural commerce with things in the world we inhabit every day, and thus also to manage to silence above all what we believe we know about things. In this regard, the exergue of the diary is already extremely illuminating: “Only the hand that erases can write the true thing” (Hammarskjöld 1983, p. XXV). Certainly, these few words can give rise to multiple interpretations. But ours—corroborated by the text that follows—is that only when the hand erases its own claim to writing and makes itself an instrument, only then can it guarantee the possibility of writing what is true, thus leaving a trace of all that it undertakes to accomplish. It is not a matter here, then, of mechanical fulfilment, but of leaving space open for the void that we are to be filled.

In this sense, the invocation of the Our Father “Thy will be done” appears several times in the diary, the subject of repeated reflections by Hammarskjöld; here is one:

“Thy will be done —”. To let the inner take precedence over the outer, the soul over the world wherever this may lead you. And, lest a worldly good should disguise itself as a spiritual, to make yourself blind to the value the life of the spirit can bestow upon life in this world. (Hammarskjöld, 1983, p. 68).

The invocation is above all an imperative to oneself so that one’s selfishness ceases to fuel attempts to help fate, disguising them in terms of nobility of spirit. The interior, emptied of all will to assert itself, of *Wille zur Macht* we might say, must have the upper hand over the world. This dialectic between the power of worldly knowledge and the oppositional force of the inner appears to be of extreme interest, not least because if not articulated well it could lead to an exacerbating short-circuit. The question that opens up is whether it is possible to think and implement a form that is contrary to the power of the exterior, to worldly knowledge, but which is configured in such a way that its opposition to power is not a mere “non”, i.e. a purely negative form, representing instead its opposite, i.e. a counter-power that does not submit to the logic and essence of power. This can only happen when the inner is clothed in a poverty that is a spoliation of all will to dominion. The interior must in this way choose a poverty so poor that it is opposed to any kind of wealth, or presumed wealth.

An example of this form of counter-power can be found in the following quote:

To preserve the silence within—amid all the noise. To remain open and quiet, a moist humus in the fertile darkness where the rain falls and the grain ripens matter how many tramp across the parade ground in whirling dust under an arid sky. (Hammar skjöld, 1983, p. 70).

To make one's body become earth, waiting for the sun and the rain, waiting for seeds to fall, to be guarded then to make them sprout. In this perspective, life is truly lived, in an unknown fullness, when one no longer lives as a stakeholder or "knower". The ability to listen and see all that is within us is only possible in darkness and silence.

In the pages of the diary, there is an awareness of the loneliness to which one is devoted on the path of renouncing the favours of the world: "To reach perfection, we must all pass, one by one, through the death of self-effacement. And, on this side of it, he will never find the way to anyone who has passed through it." (Hammar skjöld, 1983, p. 17). Loneliness in the face of one's task is also echoed in the commentary on some of Hölderlin's verses, in which torment is marked not so much by the inability, therefore impossibility, of sharing the burden one bears, but that one only has one's own burden to bear.

But the tranquillity sought by silencing the "voices from outside" does not mean either a disinterest in the lives of others, nor an attempt to succeed in making one's own voice resound in a peremptory and authoritative manner. Let us begin with this last point: the dimension of silence, acquired through the suspension of the validity of external assertions, is not the conquest by knowledge of the possibilities of my own subjectivity, albeit transcendental, to be able to ground the possibility of the true manifestation of external realities in view of an unbreakable knowledge. The stillness sought by Hammar skjöld is achieved, instead, by virtue of a deconstructive work of the Ego itself, which succeeds in understanding its own function of governing things at the moment in which it discovers itself not as the wall of the vessel, but as an emptiness that must be filled by what is given to it. It appears evident, then, that Hammar skjöld's path of *epochè*, rather than that of phenomenology, appears to have followed Meister Eckhart's lead, seeking to make *Abgeschiedenheit* and *Gelassenheit*, detachment and abandonment, two founding moments for the discovery of the true dimension of the Ego. Eckhart was a decisive teacher for Hammar skjöld, as we also read in a passage from '56 in his diaries.



And yet these references to the great Meister Eckhart should not serve to take refuge in the security of one's own certainty of faith, but on the contrary should serve as a flywheel for an intervention in reality, as can be seen from this passage:

The "mystical experience." Always *here* and *now* — in that freedom which is one with distance, in that stillness which is born of silence. But — this is a freedom in the midst of action, a stillness in the midst of other human beings. The mystery is a constant reality to him who, in this world, is free from self-concern, a reality that grows peaceful and mature before the receptive attention of assent. In our era, the road to holiness necessarily passes through the world of action. (Hammar skjöld, 1983, p. 103).

This last passage, along with others, raises an important question: can Hammar skjöld be considered a mystic? In his valuable commentary on the diaries, theologian and Church of Sweden bishop Gustaf Aulén believes that it would be inappropriate to liken him to the mystics of the medieval tradition, even though we can find linguistic and expressive affinities. This is mainly because Hammar skjöld understood himself from his relationship with Christ, seeking to make his life an *imitatio*, in the sense of following Christ in the way of sacrifice. He did not see himself as anything other than a disciple of Christ. We can therefore say that if Hammar skjöld is to be considered a mystic, his mysticism takes on a form of its own with similarities and differences compared to other figures recognised as mystics, especially considering two aspects, that concerning religion and that concerning responsibility towards others.

#### 4. **DE VERA RELIGIONE**

"The lovers of God have no religion but God alone" (Hammar skjöld, 1983, p. 86). These words, transcribed in the diary, are by Gialal al-Din Rumi, a 13th century Persian mystic poet. They indicate, as do some passages from the presentation of the Room of Stillness, Hammar skjöld's desire to conceive of religion not as a stronghold, a place that ensures a view from above and thus a supremacy over everything around us, a fortress impregnable from attacks from outside. Religion, on the other hand, must be the possibility of being able to find a dimension for the relationship with God. Faith, experienced as exclusivity, as certainty of oneself and one's convictions, jeopardises

the very possibility of an encounter with God. The following passage attests to precisely this position:

There is a pride of faith, more unforgivable and dangerous than the pride of the intellect. It reveals a split personality in which faith is “observed” and appraised, thus negating that unity born of a dying-unto-self, which is the definition of faith. To “value” faith is to turn it into a metaphysical magic, the advantages of which ought to be reserved for a spiritual elite (Hammarskjöld, 1983, p. 89).

The hybris of the certainty of one’s own capacity for self-ascertainment of truth, the result of modernity’s desire to make the subject master of the universe, can be overcome by that of faith. We can see here a critique of all the fundamentalisms that would poison relations between peoples in the following decades. Religion, therefore, must be the place of faith, which can only be the annihilation of the ego, or, as St John of the Cross put it, found several times in the diaries:

“Faith is the marriage of God and the Soul” (*St. John of the Cross*).  
 Faith *is*: it cannot, therefore, be comprehended, far less identified with, the formulae in which we paraphrase what is.  
 —“en una noche oscura” The Dark Night of the Soul — so dark that we may not even look for faith. The night in Gethsemane when the last friends left you have fallen asleep, all the others are seeking your downfall, and *God is silent*, as the marriage is consummated (Hammarskjöld, 1983, p. 81).

This union with God, represented by faith, cannot find categories ready to explain it, let alone assurances. The configuration of faith sketched out by Hammarskjöld in his diaries leads above all to the rejection of a reification of God, with the consequent danger of setting oneself up as the master of his figure. The decisive influence of Meister Eckhart, who wrote: “They say that knowledge opens up the passage through truth and goodness, projects itself onto pure being and grasps God in his nakedness, as he is without a name”, can be seen in this aspect. The following passage from the diaries shows an intimate proximity to the *Lese-* and *Lebemeister*:

“But how, then, am I to love God?” “You must love Him as if He were a non-God, a non-Spirit, a non-Person, a non-Substance: love Him simply as the One, the pure and absolute Unity in which is no trace of Duality. And into this One, we must let ourselves fall continually from

being into non-being. God helps us to do this" (Hammarskjöld, 1983, p. 92).

Undoubtedly the echoes of the words of the great Dominican mystic resonate in many passages of the diaries, but if we must find an analogy with a contemporary, it is Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It is precisely in this attitude that we can discover a basic affinity with what the Protestant theologian, condemned to death for his knowledge of the conspiracy against Hitler and hanged in 1945, wrote. Bonhoeffer was a contemporary of Hammarskjöld, not only because he was born only six months after the Swedish diplomat, but also because of the profound assonance found between the *Vägmärken* and the writings collected after his execution under the title *Widerstand und Ergebung*. We can only mention a few of these aspects here: first of all, the common view of faith in God as openness to the world, and not as closure in one's own (false) certainties. Bonhoeffer's famous expression, according to which it is necessary to separate oneself from the conception of a 'stopgap' God, is closely linked to the need to interpret faith 'worldly', i.e. to abandon the individualistic and egocentric conception of faith that creates a religion based on isolating piety. God's encounter with men takes place *jenseits*, beyond our grasp, he is beyond, or, as Hammarskjöld writes, the other.

## 5. RESPONSIBILITY

Within these coordinates, the authentic dimension for living the faith can only be that of responsibility, that is, the dimension proper to faith can only be declined as action in the world for the sake of the world. Let us start from what Bonhoeffer (2015) wrote on this subject:

Who remains steadfast? Only he who does not have as his ultimate criterion his own reason, his own principle, his own conscience, his own freedom, his own virtue, but who is ready to sacrifice all this when he is called to obedient and responsible action, in faith and in exclusive bondage to God: the responsible man, whose life does not want to be anything other than a response to God's question and call. Where are these responsible men? (p. 62)

Dag Hammarskjöld could be the embodied answer to this last question from Bonhoeffer. He, in fact, while cherishing his own spiritual life, looking within

himself through silence and prayer, acted with lucidity and decision to place himself at the service of peace. There is no room in Hammarskjöld's attitude towards his task for vacuous fatalism: 'destiny is what we do'. These words, spoken at a press conference at the New York airport, are a call to responsibility that offers no recourse to ideologies, sociologies, economic theories or religious faiths that might diminish our responsibility for what happens. Hammarskjöld, in an important speech at Cambridge University in 1958, said: "It is easy to shift responsibility onto others or, perhaps, to look for explanations in some law of history. It is less easy to look for the reasons within ourselves".

If then, faith is nothing other than the union of the soul with God, by virtue of this faith, for Hammarskjöld, one must descend into prayer, into one's inner self, to encounter the Other. All are alone in respect and in the light of union, alone before God. Hence the awareness that every act is a continuous creative act, marked by responsibility to others, but nevertheless aware that the power one has is the power that created man.

## References

- Aulén, G. (1969). *Dag Hammarskjöld's white book: An analysis of Markings*. Fortress.
- Borghesi, M. (2013). *Critica della teologia politica: Da Agostino a Peterson: La fine dell'era costantiniana*. Marietti.
- Bonhoeffer, D. (2015). *Resistenza e resa: Lettere e scritti dal carcere*. San Paolo Edizioni.
- Cacciari, M. (2013). *Il potere che frena: Saggio di teologia politica*. Adelphi.
- De Vitiis, P. (2014). *La teologia politica come problema ermeneutico*. Morcelliana.
- Esposito, R. (2013). *Due: La macchina della teologia politica e il posto del pensiero*. Einaudi.
- Fink, E. (1958). "Das Problem der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls." In *Studien zur Phänomenologie*. Nihoff.
- Fink, E. (1976). "Reflexionen zu Husserls Phänomenologischer Reduktion." In *Nähe und Distanz – Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Alber.
- Hammarskjöld, D. (1957). *A room of quiet*. <https://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/meditationroom.htm>
- Hammarskjöld, D. (1983). *Markings*. Ballantine/Epiphany/Inspirational.
- Heidegger, M. (1995). *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*. Klostermann.
- Husserl, E. (1988). *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Nijhoff.

- Maritain, J. (1936). *Humanisme intégral: Problèmes temporels et spirituels d'une nouvelle chrétienté*. Aubier.
- Meier, H. (1994). *Die Lehre Carl Schmitts: Vier Kapitel zur Unterscheidung Politischer Theologie und Politischer Philosophie*. Metzler.
- Metz, J. B. (1997). *Zum Begriff der neuen Politischen Theologie 1967-1997*. Grünewald Verlag.
- Moltmann, J. (2021). *Politische Theologie der modernen Welt*. Gütersloher.
- Schmitt, C. (1998). *Le categorie del "politico"*. Il Mulino.
- Tommaso da Kempis. (1996). *L'imitazione di Cristo*. Acquarelli.