La doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend: una objeción contra una particular concepción de racionalidad científica

Teresa Gargiulo

Resumen


La inconmensurabilidad ha ocasionado innumerables controversias y debates. En estos parece ser unánime la interpretación de tal doctrina como una objeción contra la objetividad, el realismo y el progreso científico. Ahora bien, este marco hermenéutico es estrecho para poder comprender la intencionalidad de Paul Feyerabend al formular su doctrina de la inconmensurabilidad. Pues éste no pretendió cuestionar nunca a dichas nociones en cuanto tales sino únicamente mostrar cuán vano resulta ser el intento del neo-positivismo y del racionalismo popperiano por definirlas. En un sentido positivo sostenemos que la inconmensurabilidad en Paul Feyerabend impide o evita retomar, a la hora de definir aquellas nociones, las dialécticas propias del positivismo lógico o del racionalismo crítico. Nuestra intención en este trabajo es exponer su tesis de la inconmensurabilidad como un cuestionamiento a un modo particular de concebir la racionalidad científica y a sus consecuentes nociones de objetividad, progreso y realismo científico.


Palabras clave


Feyerabend; inconmensurabilidad; criterio de demarcación; relación ciencia-metafísica; Kuhn

Texto completo:

PDF

Referencias


ACHINSTEIN, P. (1968), Concepts of Science. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

ANDERSSON, G. (1984), «¿Son Compatibles falsacionismo y falibilismo?». Estructura y desarrollo de la ciencia. Radnitzky G., Andersson G. (eds.). Madrid, Alianza: 215-232.

BHASKAR, R. (1975), «Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophers of Science». New Left Review 94: 31-55.

BROAD, P. (1979), «Paul Feyerabend: Science and the Anarchist». Science 206: 534-537.

BUNGE, M. (2003), Cápsulas. Barcelona, Gedisa.

CARNAP, R. (1978), «La Superación de la Metafísica mediante el Análisis Lógico del Lenguaje.» El Positivismo Lógico. Ayer A. (Comp.) México, Fondo de Cultura Económica: 66-87.

COUNIHAN, T. (1976), «Epistemology and Science - Feyerabend and Lecourt». Economy and Society 5: 470-472.

DAVIDSON, D. (1984), «On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme». Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 183-198.

DEVITT, M. (1979), «Against Incommensurability». Australian Journal of Philosophy 57:29-50

DEVITT, M. (2001), «Incommensurability and the Priority of Metaphysics». Incommensurability and Related Matters. P. Hoyningen. Huene and H Sankey (eds.). Dordrecht, Kluwer: 143-157.

DEVITT, M., STERELNY K. (1999), Language and Reality. 2nd. Edition. Oxford, Blackwell.

DILWORTH C. (2007). Scientific Progress. A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation between Successive Scientific Theories. Dordrecht, Springer.

ENÇ, B. (1976), «Reference of Theoretical Terms». Nous 10: 261-282.

FARRELL, R. (2003), Feyerabend and Scientific Values. Tightrope-Walking Rationality, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands.

FEYERABEND, P. (1954/1955), «Review of Wittgenstein´s Philosophical Investigations». The Philosophical Review 64: 449-483.

FEYERABEND, P. (1955/1981), «Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 99-130.

FEYERABEND, P. (1958a), «Complementarity». Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 32: 75-104.

FEYERABEND, P. (1958b), «An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience». Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58: 143-170.

FEYERABEND, P. (1958c), «Review of Mathematical Foundations of Quantum- Mechanics. By John von Neumann». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8: 343-347.

FEYERABEND, P. (1958/1981a), «An attempt at a realistic interpretation of experience». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 17-36.

FEYERABEND, P. (1958/1981b), «Reichenbach´s Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 236-246.

FEYERABEND, P. (1959), «Comments on Sellars. The Language of Theories». Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science. Symposia of Scientists and Philosophers. Proceedings of Section L of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. H. Feigl- G. Maxwell (eds.), New York, Holt, Rinehart- Winston.

FEYERABEND, P. (1960/1981a), «On the Interpretation of scientific theories». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 37-43.

FEYERABEND, P. (1960/1981b), «Professor Bhom´s Philosophy of Nature». Realism, rationalism and scientific method. Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 219-235.

FEYERABEND, P. (1960/1999), «The Problem of the Existence of Theoretical Entities». Paul K. Feyerabend: Knowledge, Science and Relativism, Philosophical Papers Volume 3. John Preston (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 16-49.

FEYERABEND, P. (1960/2005), «El problema de la existencia de las entidades teóricas». Scientiae Studia 3: 277-312.

FEYERABEND, P. (1961), «Review of Metascientific Queries and Causality. By Mario Bunge». Philosophical Review 70: 396-405.

FEYERABEND, P. (1961b), «Review of an Introduction to the Logic of the Sciences. By Rom Harré». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12: 245-250.

FEYERABEND, P. (1961/1995), «Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas S. Kuhn on a Draft of The Stucture of Scientific Revolutions». Hoyningen-Huene P. (ed.). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26: 353-387.

FEYERABEND, P. (1961/1999), «Knowledge without foundation». Paul K. Feyerabend: Knowledge, Science and Relativism, Philosophical Papers Volume 3, John Preston (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 50-77.

FEYERABEND, P. (1962), «Problems of Microphysics». Frontiers of Science and Philosophy: University of Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy of Science Volume 1. Colodny R. (ed.). Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press: 189-283.

FEYERABEND, P. (1962/1981a), «Hidden variables and the argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 298-342.

FEYERABEND, P. (1962/1981b), «Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 44-96.

FEYERABEND, P. (1962/1989), Límites de la ciencia. Explicación, reducción y empirismo. Barcelona, Paidós.

FEYERABEND, P. (1963), «Review of Erkenntnislehre. By Victor Kraft». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13: 319-323.

FEYERABEND, P. (1963/1999), «How to be a good empiricist: a plea for tolerance in matters epistemological». Paul K. Feyerabend: Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Philosophical Papers Volume 3, John Preston (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 78-103.

FEYERABEND, P. (1964/1981), «Realism and Instrumentalism: Comments on the Logic of Factual Support». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 176-202.

FEYERABEND, P. (1965), «Problems of Empiricism». Beyond the Edge of Certainty. Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Colodny R. (ed.). Pittsburg, CPS Publications in the Philosophy of Science: 145-260.

FEYERABEND, P. (1965/1981a), «On the «Meaning» of Scientific Terms». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 97-103.

FEYERABEND, P. (1965/1981b), «Reply to Criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam». en Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 104-131.

FEYERABEND, P. (1966), «Herbert Feigl: A biographical Sketch». Mind, Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. Feyerabend P. & Maxwell G. (eds.). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 3-13.

FEYERABEND, P. (1967a), «The Mind-Body Problem». Continuum 5: 35-49.

FEYERABEND, P. (1967b), «Review of Law and Psychology in Conflict». By J. Marshall. Inquiry 10: 114-120.

FEYERABEND, P. (1968), «On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part I». Philosophy of Science 35: 309-331.

FEYERABEND, P. (1969/1981a), «Science without Experience». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 132-135.

FEYERABEND, P. (1969/1981b), «Linguistic arguments and scientific method». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical papers vol. I. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 146-160.

FEYERABEND, P., HANSON, N. et al. (1970), Discussion at the Conference on Correspondence Rules. Radner M. & Winokur S. (eds.). Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy Science IV. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

FEYERABEND, P. (1970/1981), «Consolations for the Specialist». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 131-167.

FEYERABEND, P. (1970/1989), Contra el Método. Esquema de una Teoría Anarquista del Conocimiento. Barcelona, Ariel.

FEYERABEND, P. (1970/1999a), «Experts in a Free Society». Paul K. Feyerabend: Knowledge, Science and Relativism, Philosophical Papers Volume 3, John Preston (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 112-126.

FEYERABEND, P. (1970/1999b), «Philosophy of Science: A Subject with a Great Past». Paul K. Feyerabend: Knowledge, Science and Relativism, Philosophical Papers Volume 3, John Preston (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 127-137.

FEYERABEND, P. (1975/1992), Tratado contra el Método. Esquema de una Teoría Anarquista del Conocimiento. Madrid, Tecnos.

FEYERABEND, P. (1976), «Logic, Literacy and Professor Gellner». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27: 381-391.

FEYERABEND, P. (1977), «Review of Changing Patterns of Reconstruction». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28: 351-382.

FEYERABEND, P. (1977/1999), «Rationalism, Relativism and Scientific Method». Paul K. Feyerabend: Knowledge, Science and Relativism, Philosophical Papers Volume 3, John Preston (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 200-211.

FEYERABEND, P. (1978/1982), La Ciencia en una Sociedad Libre. Madrid, Veintiuno Editores s.a.

FEYERABEND, P. (1978/1981), «Philosophy of Science versus scientific practice: observations on Mach, his followers and his opponents». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 80-88.

FEYERABEND, P. (1980/1981), «Mach, Einstein and the Popperians». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 89-98.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981a), Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981b), «Introduction: Scientific Realism and Philosophical Realism». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 3-16.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981c), «Introduction: Proliferation and Realism as Methodological Principles». Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 139-145.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981d), «Introduction to volumes 1 y 2». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: vii-xii.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981e), «Historical Background: Some Observations on the Decay of the Philosophy of Science». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1-33.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981f), «The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 202-230.

FEYERABEND, P. (1981g), «More Clothes from the Emperor´s Bargain basement: a Review of Laudan’s Progress and its Problems». Problems of Empiricism. Philosophical Papers Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 231-246.

FeEYERABEND, P. (1981h), Tratado contra el método. 2ª ed. Madrid: Tecnos.

FEYERABEND, P. (1987a), «Putnam on Incommensurability: Comments on Reason, Truth and History». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38: 75-81.

FEYERABEND, P. (1987b), «Reason, Xenophanes and the Homeric Gods». The Kenyon Review 9:12-22.

FEYERABEND, P. (1987/2005), Adiós a la Razón, Tercera edición. Madrid, Técnos.

FEYERABEND, P. (1989), «Realism and the Historicity of Knowledge». Journal of Philosophy 86: 393-406.

FEYERABEND, P. (1989/2000), Diálogos sobre el Método. 2ª ed. Madrid, Cátedra.

FEYERABEND, P. (1991a), Three Dialogues on Knowledge. Cambridge, Basil Blackwell.

FEYERABEND, P. (1991b), Diálogos sobre el conocimiento. Madrid: Cátedra.

FEYERABEND, P. (1991/2003), Provocaciones Filosóficas. Madrid, Editorial Biblioteca Nueva.

FEYERABEND, P. (1992), «Review of Science and Relativism. Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. By Larry Laudan». Isis 83: 367-368.

FEYERABEND, P. (1993/2008), Against Method. Third Edition. London, Verso.

FEYERABEND, P. (1994/1995), Matando el tiempo. Autobiografía. Madrid, Debate S.A.

FEYERABEND, P. (1994/1999), La Conquista de la Abundancia. La abstracción frente a la riqueza del ser. Barcelona: Paidós.

FEYERABEND, P. (1994/2000), «Paul Feyerabend: Last Interview». By Jung J. The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 159-168.

FEYERABEND, P. (1999), Ambigüedad y Armonía. Barcelona, Paidós.

FINE, A. (1975), «How to Compare Theories: Reference and Chance». Nous 9: 51-65.

FINOCCHIARO, M. (1973), «Review of I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge». Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 3: 361.

GELLNER, E. (1975), «Review of Beyond Truth and Falsehood». The British Journal of Philosophy of Science 26: 331-342.

GENTILE, N. (2007), «El camino de Feyerabend: crítica, proliferación y realismo», Filosofía Unisinos 8: 109-127.

GIEDYMIN, J. (1971), «Consolations for the Irrationalist». British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22: 39-53.

GRUNFELD, J. (1984), «Feyerabend´s Irrational Science». Logical Analisys 27: 221-232.

HATTIANGADI, J. (1977), «The Crisis in Methodology: Feyerabend». Philosophy of the Social Sciences 7: 289-302.

HATTIANGADI, J. (2000), «Two Concepts of Political Tolerance». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 125-147.

HORGAN, J. (1993), «Paul Karl Feyerabend: El Peor Enemigo de la Ciencia», Investigación y Ciencia 201: 34-48.

HOYNINGEN-HUENE, P. (2000a), «Paul K. Feyerabend. An Obituary». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 3-15.

HOYNINGEN-HUENE, P. (2000b), «Paul K. Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 102-114.

HOYNINGEN-HUENE, P., SANKEY, H. (eds). (2001), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

HAHN, H., NEURATH, O y CARNAP, R. (2002), «La concepción científica del mundo: el Círculo de Viena». REDES 18: 103-149.

HUME, D. (2004), Investigación sobre el entendimiento humano. Madrid: Istmo.

KANT, I. (2003), Crítica de la razón pura. Buenos Aires, Losada.

KITCHER, P. (1978), «Theory, Theorist and Theoretical Change». The philosophical Review 87: 519-547.

KLIMOVSKY, G. (2001), Las desventuras del conocimiento científico. Una introducción a la epistemología. Quinta edición. Buenos Aires, A-Z Editora.

KORDIG, C. (1970), «Feyerabend and Radical Meaning Variance». Noüs 4: 399-404.

KRIPKE, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity. Oxford, Blackwell.

KROON, F. (1985), «Theoretical Terms and the Causal Views of Reference». Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63: 143-166.

KUHN, T. (1970a), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2da ed. Chicago, Chicago University Press.

KUHN, T. (1970b), «Reflections On My Critics». Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium the Philosophy of Science, London 1965. Lakatos I, Musgrave A. (eds.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 231-278.

KUHN, T. (1976), «Theory Change as Structure Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism». Erkenntnis 10: 179-190.

KUHN, T. (1977), The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Traditions and Change. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

KUHN, T. (1979), «Metaphor in Science». Methaphor and Thought. Ortony A. (ed.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 409-419.

KUHN, T. (1983), Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability. Asquith P. and Nickles T. (eds.) PSA 1982, Volume 2. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association: 669-688.

KULKA, T. (1977), «How far does anything go? Comments on Feyerabend’s Epistemological Anarchism». Philosophy of the social sciences 7: 277-287.

LAYMON, R. (1977), «Feyerabend, Brownian Motion, and the Hiddenness of Refuting Facts». Philosophy of Science 44: 225-247.

LLOYD, E., (2000), «Feyerabend, Mill, and Pluralism». The Worst Enemy of Science? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 115-124.

MUNÉVAR, G. (1999), «Reviews Symposia: Radical Fallibilism vs Conceptual Analysis: The Significance of Feyerabend’s Philosophy of Science». Metascience 8: 216-226.

MUNÉVAR, G. (2000a), «Preface». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: v-vi.

MUNÉVAR, G. (2000b), «A Rehabilitation of Paul Feyerabend». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 58-79.

MUNÉVAR, G. (2006), Variaciones filosóficas sobre temas de Feyerabend. Germán Guerrero Pino (Comp.). Caracas, Programa editorial Universidad del Valle.

NICKELS, T. (1998), «La Epistemología según Feyerabend». Cinta de Moebio 4: 123-129.

NOLA, R. (1980), «Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms». Philosophy of Science 47: 505-531.

OBERHEIM, E. (2006), Feyerabend’s Philosophy. Quellen Und Studien Zur Philosophie. Berlín, Walter de Gruyter.

PAPINEAU, D. (1979), Theory and Meaning. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PARSONS, K. (1975), «A Criterion for Meaning Change». Philosophical Studies 28: 367-396.

PEROVICH, A. (1991), «Incommensurability, its Varieties and its Ontological Consequences», en Beyond reason: essays and the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend, Gonzalo Munevar (ed.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v.132, Washington, pp. 313-328.

POPPER, K. (1972), Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 4th ed. London: Routledge.

POPPER, K. (1957), «The Aim of Science» Ratio 1: 24-35.

POPPER, K. (1980), The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 4th. ed. London, Routledge.

PRESTON, J. (1997), Feyerabend. Philosophy, Science and Society. Oxford, Blackwell.

PRESTON, J. (2000), «Science as Supermarket: ‘Post-Modern’ Themes in Paul Feyerabend’s Later Philosophy of Science». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 80-101.

PUTNAM, H. (1965), «How Not to Talk About Meaning». Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science. Volume 2. In Honor of Philipp Frank. Cohen R., Wartofsky (eds.). New York, Humanities Press.

PUTNAM, H. (1975), Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

QUINE, W. (1986), La relatividad ontológica y otros ensayos. Madrid: Tecnos.

QUINE, W. (1992), La búsqueda de la verdad. Barcelona: Crítica.

RIBES, D. (1989), «Introducción: Pluralismo teórico y límites de la ciencia». Feyerabend

P. K., Límites de la ciencia. Explicación, reducción y empirismo, Barcelona, Paidós: 9-35.

ROSSI, P. (1975), «Hermeticism, Rationality and the Scientific Revolution». Reason, Experiment and Mysticism in the Scientific Revolution. Righini Bonelli M. L., Shea W.R. (eds). London, Macmillan.

SANKEY, H. (1994), The Incommensurability Thesis. Aldershot, Avebury.

SANKEY, H., HOYNINGEN-HUENE, P. (2001), «Introduction». Incommensurability and Related Matters. Hoyningen-Huene, P., Sankey, H. (eds). Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers: vii-xxxiv.

SCHEFFLER, I. (1967), Science and Subjectivity. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill.

SHAPERE, D. (1966), «Meaning and the Scientific Change». Mind and Cosmos. Colodny R. (ed.). Pittsburgh, Pittsurgh University Press: 41-85.

SUPPE, F. (1990), La Estructura de las teorías científicas. Madrid, UNED.

THEOCHARIS, T., MIHALIS, P. (1987), Where Science Has Gone Wrong, Nature 329: 595-598.

VAN FRAASSEN, B. (2000), «Sola Experientia? Feyerabend´s Refutation of Classical Empiricism». The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 28-36.

WATKINS, J. (2000), Feyerabend among Popperians 1948-1978. The Worst Enemy of Science ? Essays in memory of Paul Feyerabend. J. Preston, G. Munévar and D. Lamb (eds.). New York, Oxford University Press: 47- 57.

WORRALL, J. (1978a), «Is the Empirical Content of a Theory Dependent on its Rivals?». Acta Philosophica Fennica 30: 298-310.

WORRALL, J. (1978b), «Against too much Method». Erkenntnis 13: 279-295.




DOI: https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v73.i276.y2017.006

Enlaces refback

  • No hay ningún enlace refback.

Comentarios sobre este artículo

Ver todos los comentarios




Licencia Creative Commons
Revista Pensamiento (ISSN impreso: 0031-4749 / ISSN digital: 2386-5822) editada por Universidad Pontificia Comillas se encuentra bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Unported
 

Revista Pensamiento

Universidad Pontificia Comillas

Departamento de Filosofía, Humanidades y Comunicación | Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales

Universidad de Comillas, 3-5 - 28049 Madrid

Tel. +34 91 734 39 50 | E-mail: pensamientodireccion@gmail.com