Current trends in executive compensation. Increased transparency in Spain thanks to the annual remuneration report

Authors

  • Carlos Anta Callersten Acciona
  • Antonio Núñez Partido Universidad Pontificia Comillas

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14422/icade.i93.y2014.004

Keywords:

Remuneration, Executive Compensation, Transparency, Annual Remuneration Report, Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR

Abstract

Executive compensation has been one of the most controversial topics in recent years. There are two unstoppable trends in this field. On the one hand, the incentives design is evolving from models that consider only financial objectives towards a broader approach influenced by the Corporate Social Responsibility framework that takes into account environmental and social measures. On the other hand, and as a consequence of the new theoretic framework, all recent Codes of Conduct are enforcing the need for transparency. In this article, we analyze the path towards transparency in the case of Spain and the new Annual Remuneration Report that has been approved for all public listed companies.

Author Biography

Carlos Anta Callersten, Acciona

Director de Compensación y Beneficios de Acciona

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Published

2014-12-01

How to Cite

Anta Callersten, C., & Núñez Partido, A. (2014). Current trends in executive compensation. Increased transparency in Spain thanks to the annual remuneration report. Icade. Journal of the Faculty of Law at Universidad Pontificia Comillas, (93), 85–102. https://doi.org/10.14422/icade.i93.y2014.004