Coercive Diplomacy as a strategy vis à vis North Korea
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/cir.i12.y2018.005Keywords:
North Korea, proliferation, nuclear, deterrence, coercive diplomacyAbstract
A review of the state of art regarding the conflict with North Korea leads us to the conclusion that all the strategies have been developed already to deal with that state, but none of them has resulted efective. Thus, in the pages to follow, we will try to show the strategies which have been developed and to some extent, the reasons why they have failed. Besides we will explain which are the new elements in the strategy which is currently in place. Last but not least, we will analyse the main questions which might condition the success of the current strategy and the extent to which this strategy may be really effective.
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