What neuroscience can tell us about free will: questioning its methodology and its possibility to solve the problem
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v75.i283.y2019.013Keywords:
determinism, free will, naturalism, neuroscienceAbstract
The old problem of free will and determinism has been taken up today by the neurosciences from a naturalistic perspective. There are many methodological and conceptual problems that researchers face in trying to scientifically solve the question of the existence of free will. Our goal will be subject to review one of the budgets of these investigations, the possibility of quantifying free will as a fact. To do this we will discuss first the difficulties relating to this claim. After that we will establish what are the conditions of possibility of free will in order to criticize the psychological and neuroscientific perspectives, we suggest that both are unable to offer knowledge about the existence of these conditions. Also, we offer some methodological considerations attending the famous Libet’s experiment.Downloads
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