Mereological aspects of substances
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v80.i311.y2024.035Keywords:
substance, mereology, structureAbstract
The present work aims to account for the relevance that certain mereological aspects of substances have for an adequate understanding of these types of entities. To achieve this, the paper first discusses how the notion of substance has been analyzed within the context of contemporary Aristotelianism, followed by a critique of such analyses. Subsequently, motivated by this critique, a mereological pluralist framework is proposed, aiming to provide a foundation for a different way of defining the notion of substance.
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