The concept and truth in Heidegger and Zubiri (Dialogue with theories of abstraction and the hermeneutics)

Abstract

This article ses out and analyses Heidegger’s criticism against the conceptism from classical metaphysics and its abstraction theory, which according to the thought of the German thinker should be both founded in language’s wear and in the unsuitable use that classical metaphysics do from it distorting and hiding the very genuine sense from Greek thought and being in the Greek culture. Heidegger postulates the insufficiency of the concept and of the logic while he
proposes the need of an hermeneutical method. The article points out the overlapping perspectives between Heidegger’s proposal and Zubiri criticism against idealism and conceptism. Taking into account all that, the author will show, that they are possible descriptive concepts, which are able
to adapt to the real. This fact implies there is a substantial moment in reality, which remain present during a certain time (so it implies that Heidegger criticism again the «metaphysic of the presence» is neither acceptable). The article explains and analyses the excellent Zubiri criticism against the
classical theory of abstraction, by trying to harmonize it with the validity of the descriptive concepts and with universal moments of the reality. The main thesis is that first philosophy could not be reduced to hermeneutic.