Determinism, fatalism, neccesity: Cicero against the Stoics
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v71.i267.y2015.007Keywords:
freedom, necessity, determinism, divination, Cicero, Carneades, Chrysippus.Abstract
In the first part of this paper, I analyze the logical-epistemological categories that Cicero uses to address the problem of determinism, and in particular, the distinction between causal and logical-epistemological necessity. In this context, the problem of divination, that is, the ability to utter true statements about the future, is fundamental for Cicero, which suggests —as I argue in the second part of this paper— that Ciciero's substantive argument, albeit highly technical, in essence is not logical-epistemological, since what is fundamentally at issue is a religious, or political-religious, problem. Following Carneades, Cicero directly criticizes Stoic epistemology (in particular Chrysippus’s version), but he does so because, indirectly, and independent of the skeptical philosopher, Cicero wants to overcome the theological implications of the Stoic concept of fate, which, in turn, is central to his political project for the reconstruction of the res publica: logic, religion and politics thus go hand in hand.Downloads
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