The transhumanism of Ray Kurzweil. Is biological ontology reducible to computation?

Abstract

Computer programs, primarily engineering machine vision and programming of somatic sensors, have already allowed, and they will do it more perfectly in the future, to build high perfection androids or cyborgs. They will collaborate with man and open new moral reflections to respect the ontological dignity in the new humanoid machines. In addition, both men and new androids will be in connection with huge external computer networks that will grow up to almost incredible levels the efficiency in the domain of body and nature. However, our current scientific knowledge, on the one hand, about hardware and software that will support both the humanoid machines and external computer networks, made with existing engineering (and also the foreseeable medium and even long term engineering) and, on the other hand, our scientific knowledge about animal and human behavior from neural-biological structures that produce a psychic system, allow us to establish that there is no scientific basis to talk about an ontological identity between the computational machines and man. Accordingly, different ontologies (computational machines and biological entities) will produce various different functional systems. There may be simulation, but never ontological identity. These ideas are essential to assess the transhumanism of Ray Kurzweil.