Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v72.i273.y2016.003Keywords:
neuroethics, naturalistic fallacy, dual process theory of moral judgment, Joshua Greene, George Edward Moore.Abstract
In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I highlight and question Greene’s naturalized way of understanding Deontologism. Thirdly, I assert the distinction between "neural basis" and "moral foundation" as the key to avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy. Finally and according to that key distinction I assess Greene’s neuroethical approach and I analyse some of its most critical aspects related to normative issues.
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