The Good as a Perceptual Object of Passions in Aristotelian Moral Epistemology

Abstract

Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good.