First Person Genuine Inverse Akrasia

Authors

  • Ignasi Llobera Trias Estudios Aristotélicos de Filosofía Práctica. Universitat de Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v73.i275.y2017.004

Keywords:

akrasia, inverse akrasia, Aristotle, Arpaly, Huckleberry Finn

Abstract

An akratic act has traditionally been considered to be morally worse than the act that the agent decided to perform in the first place. Against this, Arpaly coined the phrase «inverse akrasia» to refer to those akratic acts that are morally better. Arpaly’s analysis of the concept of inverse akrasia is insufficient; it has been largely developed through famous examples like that of Huckleberry Finn. The reasons why the different examples of inverse akrasia seem problematic will be analyzed, leading to problematize the concept of inverse akrasia itself. Illustrated by a new example of inverse akrasia, the concept itself and its ethical implications will be clarified.

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References

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How to Cite

Llobera Trias, I. (2017). First Person Genuine Inverse Akrasia. Pensamiento. Revista De Investigación E Información Filosófica, 73(275), 61–75. https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v73.i275.y2017.004