M. Merleau-Ponty and H. Arendt: Thinking in History

Abstract

In this work we intend to compare and contrast the explicit and implicit Merleau-Ponty’s and Arendt’s conceptions of historicity. We begin by tracing their affiliation with Phenomenology, whose common thread is the search for the meaning of experience even in the nonsense, opening to it from their situations and commitment in order to insight into the fragility and contingency that they never eliminated them from philosophizing. We will show that Merleau-ponty’s development of genetic phenomenology, particularly his interpretation of the Husserlian concept of the Stiftung, it makes possible a conception of history that could be accepted by Arendt, in the same way she did with his indirect ontology and philosophical interrogation. Despite Arendt’s hostility to the reversibility of the chair (flesh), which will limit the Arendtian conception of action and thinking, the interrelation of both thoughts it will reveal the need for a new philosophy of history.