The Spinozist background of contemporary Dual Aspect Monism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v81.i313.y2025.005Keywords:
Spinoza, Dual Aspect Monism, consciousness, mind-body problem, hard problem of consciousnessAbstract
Dual Aspect Monism (DAM) is a metaphysical theory about the relationship between the mental and the physical and about the constitution of nature in general. Contemporaneously it has been developed by various authors as an answer to the hard problem of consciousness. Some of them, such as Velmans or Strawson, mention that Spinoza's metaphysics is found within the background of this theory, however, they don’t delve into the understanding of this relationship. The present work seeks to address this gap, evidencing not only that Spinoza's metaphysics turns out to be a significant background for contemporary DAM, but also, exposing that such antecedents allow a better understanding of DAM in its current form.
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