Rationalism and emotivism from a neuroethic approach
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v73.i276.y2017.023Keywords:
neuroethics, Lakoff, Haidt, Mercier, deliberationAbstract
The development of neuroethics has used to privilege the role of emotion in contrast to reasoning in moral deliberation. My aim in this paper to oppose two models of moral deliberation articulated from neuroethics: the emotivist one, developed by Haidt and Lakoff; and the rationalist one, elaborated by Hugo Mercier. My aim is to stablish if Mercier rehabilitates reasoning in neuroethics or if his approach is an emotivist one too.
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