Does Neuroscience lead to a Naturalization of Deontologism? Reflection on the «Deontological Moral Judgments» from a neuroethical approach

Abstract

According to the research in the field of neuroethics and more specifically in the theory of dual process of moral judgment, in authors such as Joshua Greene, we pose the question whether neuroscience leads ineluctably to a «naturalization of Deontologism». So, in my communication I criticize a way of doing neuroscience by reducing deontological moral judgments exclusively to a kind of emotional response. Beyond this model I propose another way of doing «neuroethics» where the psychophysical structures of morality are considered without incurring the myopic reductionist naturalism. According to this second approach, it is about discovering the neuroscience of ethics, namely, the nature of morality without reducing morality to nature. From that approach, neuroscience can contribute to an interdisciplinary work in order to understand the vast human nature in all its breadth.