Exposition of three premises that allow a rational knowledge of moral issues

Abstract

This paper analyzes the reasons why the Enlightenment project of providing a rational foundation for morality failed. The emergence of an emotivist conception of the self, which recognizes no authority other than subjectivity itself, entailed the loss of theological and teleological elements that for centuries had given consistency to the moral order. The proposal of this article is to recover three fundamental premises that, without renouncing the achievements of modernity in terms of the recognition of the individual, serve as a rational basis for restoring a moral order whose foundations have universal validity. The first premise, speculative in nature, establishes the connection of human freedom with its theological roots. The second premise, practical in nature, places virtue as the teleological foundation of the moral order. The third premise, methodological in nature, proposes fallibilism as an appropriate scientific method for advancing our understanding of moral issues, considering the complexity posed by cultural diversity and the specific circumstances of each case.