The Socratic Ignorance as Epistemic Virtue
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v77.i293.y2021.006Keywords:
Socrates, Plato, ignorance, knowledge, epistemic virtueAbstract
In this article I argue that an especial kind of ignorance, of «Socratic» overtones, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. Socrates noted the relevance of a certain type of ignorance in the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the epistemic division of labor in society. Firstly, I explain how I understand the so-called «Socratic Ignorance» (SI) as different from what I will call «stubborn ignorance» (SI). Then, I discuss some intellectual vices (such as epistemic arrogance) and the role that intellectual virtues (epistemic humility and autonomy) can have regarding stubborn ignorance as a corrective that has both epistemic and moral implications. This kind of approach can be very helpful for exploiting some assumptions of contemporary social epistemology, according to which the acquisition of knowledge is made from others and with others.
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