Beliefs and imaginings: Re-examining the typological problem of delusions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v79.i302.y2023.014Keywords:
typological problem, delusions, psychosis, beliefs, imaginingsAbstract
The typological problem emerges when trying to define the type of mental state underlying delusional verbal reports. This article explores two of the most popular answers to this problem in the current literature within philosophy of mind. The analysis concludes that the doxastic approach —that characterizes delusions as a type of belief— is more plausible in conceptual, empirical, and phenomenological terms than the imaginistic approach that characterizes delusions as a type of imaginative mental state. Finally, it is concluded with some challenges that the doxastic approach needs to face in order to extend its scope and explanatory power.
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