Creencias e imaginaciones: reexaminando el problema tipológico de los delirios
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14422/pen.v79.i302.y2023.014Palabras clave:
problema tipológico, delirios, psicosis, creencias, imaginacionesResumen
El problema tipológico surge al intentar definir el tipo de estado mental que subyace a los reportes de pacientes delirantes. Este artículo explora dos de los enfoques más populares a este problema en la literatura actual en filosofía de la mente. El análisis concluye que el enfoque doxástico —que conceptualiza los delirios como creencias anormales— es superior en términos conceptuales, empíricos y fenomenológicos al enfoque imaginístico, que caracteriza a los delirios como un tipo de estado mental imaginario. Finalmente, se concluye con algunos de los desafíos que el enfoque necesita resolver para ampliar su alcance y poder explicativo.
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